
Indonesia's Diplomacy Towards the Free Papua Organization (OPM)

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Abstract. Para diplomacy is conducted by a sub-nation entity, such as the Free Papua Organization (OPM), a representative of groups within the state to gain independence. Indonesia has had long negotiation experience with separatist groups, such as the *Republic of South Maluku* (RMS), pro-independence in East Timor (Fretilin), and the *Free Aceh Movement* (GAM). Indonesia's diplomacy with the three movements has succeeded in solving the problem with various peace agreements. Since 1967, with the signing of the referendum, Indonesia still had to resolve various issues that led to the demand for independence. This paper analyzes Indonesia's diplomacy towards OPM by implementing SWAA instruments, namely *Strength, Weakness, Advocacy and Adversary*, in bilateral and multilateral context. Based on para diplomacy's main objectives to reinforce identity claims, build and assert claims through actions to influence the international community, the analysis is focused on Indonesian efforts to weaken claims. The purpose of the study is to determine the supporting factors or challenges of OPM's para diplomacy. The study would become a reference to the government and decision makers while from a theoretical aspect, would enrich understanding of para diplomacy. Hopefully that the study could support the Indonesian vision to maintain state sovereignty and integrity.

Key words: diplomacy, bilateral, multilateral, *para diplomacy*, Indonesia, OPM

Introduction

Since the Province of Papua integrated as part of Indonesia following the referendum or the Determination of People's Opinion (*Pepera*) in 1969, it remained a political and economic problem. One of the causes of the unresolved problem in Papua was the implementation of referendums that were considered as illegal and unrepresentative according to the majority of the population. The problem began when Indonesia gained independence from the Netherlands in 1945, but the Dutch did not cede Papua to the new Republic. To resolve the issue, the United Nations conducted negotiations through the Round Table Conference (RTC) on December 27, 1949 in The Hague. The content of the RTC agreement is "recognition and handover of power over the Dutch colonies to Indonesia". West Papua was not part of this negotiation and the Dutch returned two years after the signed agreement. The content of the RTC agreement was denied by the Netherlands who not only stayed in Papua, but prepared measures to separate the region from Indonesia. The Netherlands established the *Papuan National Council* and declared independence on December 1, 1961. The action to form a puppet state in Papua was retaliated by Indonesia by announcing a military action called the *Tri Komando Rakyat* (Trikorra) on December 19th, 1961. The Trikorra aimed to restore the region as part of the Republic and led to the confrontation between the two militaries.*

Indonesia's position was defended by the United States of America (US) and the United Kingdom (UK), by facilitating the Indonesia-Netherlands negotiations that resulted in the *New York Agreement* (NYA) in 1962. The UN brought its results to the UN forum, which was then accepted and confirmed by a resolution. In principle the UN provided for the handover of Dutch power over Papua to be carried out indirectly.

* <https://www.britannica.com/place/Papua>, accessed on June 10th, 2023.

On October 1, 1962, the Deputy Governor-General of the Netherlands, H. Veldkamp, handed over his power over West Papua to a specially formed UN agency, *the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority* (UNTEA). This event followed by handing over the government of Papua on May 1, 1963, through a referendum. The process of preparing for the referendum by UNTEA took seven years, and was implemented in 1969. The referendum result was Papua returned to Indonesia, and declared as the 26th province under the name Irian Jaya. The result of the referendum was opposed by the Dutch considering the process that did not apply the principle of one man one vote. Only one percent of the population was involved while the majority was not represented. However, the referendum was ratified by the United Nations General Assembly (UN-GA) under resolution No. 2504 on October 19, 1969. The decision was opposed by the Free Papua Movement (OPM) as well as a number of independent observers. The ratification of the referendum by the UN has become the beginning of the Papua-Indonesia conflict.[†]

Ever since, the Indonesia-Papua's conflict was internationalized by the OPM. The organization was founded in 1965 with the aim of ending Indonesian rule in the Province of Papua. Currently the OPM consists of three factions; the first is the armed groups, each of which has control of different territories namely Timika, the Highlands and the North Coast. The OPM's first resistance was launched in Manokwari on July 26, 1965. The second faction is the OPM Revolution Council (OPMRC) which was established in 1982 under the leadership of Moses Werror. The Council struggled through diplomacy to gain international recognition and independence through the UN, the South Pacific Forum (SPF)/the Pacific Island Forum (PIF), and the Southeast Asian regional organization (ASEAN). The third faction is the West Papua National Liberation Army (TPNPB). It is the armed wing of the Free Papua Organization, and has been labelled as a terrorist organization by the Indonesian government (Lawson, 2016).

Issues that are often the source of the Indonesia-Papua conflict are marginalization, discrimination, and the lack of recognition of Papua's contribution to Indonesia. In addition, the non-optimal development of social infrastructure in Papua, especially in terms of education, health, economic empowerment, and the low involvement of indigenous Papuan economic actors. The process of political, economic, and socio-cultural integration that has not been completed remains a problem. In addition, the cycle of political violence widespread and various human rights violations has not been addressed and resolved. The OPM faction that specifically demonstrated and staged protests had a small group of leaders based abroad; in the Pacific, Europe and the US. The group seeks to raise awareness on the Papua issue and increased international support for independence. One of the supports was obtained from the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG), an organization founded in 1988. Initially the MSG consisted of four countries; Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu.

In 1989, the Kanak and Socialist National Liberation Front (FLNKS), a pro-independence alliance of political parties in New Caledonia, officially admitted as a new member of MSG. In 1996 Fiji was admitted as new member and the admission had motivated the OPM to apply for membership. However, at the MSG meeting in July 2016 in Solomon Islands, the proposal of West Papua National Coalition for Liberation (WPNCL) membership was denied.

MSG initially focused on increasing economic growth between Melanesian countries. However, the organization supports every struggle for Melanesian self-determination, while continuously disclosing human rights violations against West Papua by the Indonesian government. Vanuatu plays an important role in raising the issue of Papuan independence in world-level forums as shown by Prime Minister Charlot Salwai Tabimasma. His support for

[†] <https://www.britannica.com/place/Papua>, op.cit.

the ULMWP struggle demonstrated through his disclosure on various human rights violations in Papua, with the most prominent was his speech at the UN-GA. Another support announced by Vanuatu's first Prime Minister Walter Hadye Lini, stated that Vanuatu was not completely independent until the whole of Melanesia were free from colonialism. Vanuatu's Foreign Minister, Bruno Leingkone, has also consistently supported Papua by affirming the Melanesian sense of unity and solidarity.

The spirit of anti-colonialism is also supported by the principle of "The Melanesian Way" initiated by Papua New Guinea (PNG)-born philosopher Bernard Narokobi in the 1970s. Narokobi argues that Melanesia includes the territories of the Indonesian Papua, PNG, the Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, New Caledonia, and Fiji. The spirit of "Melanesian Way", is to support the Melanesian independence which previously had long been colonized by European powers. A prominent leader of the United Liberation Movement for West Papua (ULMWP) is Benny Wenda, who consistently fought for Papua independence. In May 2016 in London, a meeting of the International Parliamentarians for West Papua (IPWP) was held resulting in the "Westminster Declaration". The Declaration essentially condemns human rights violations in West Papua, demands the right to self-determination, and a statement of the illegality of the 1969 Pepera. The Westminster Declaration was signed by 95 IPWP members in London, and eleven New Zealand MPs from four political parties.

Beside support from various governments, the Papuan independence is also supported by non-governmental organizations. One of them is during the Pasifika Festival in Auckland, New Zealand. The annual festival has been held since 1993 to celebrate cultural experiences of Pacific nations. In 2014, the drama entitled "Oceania Interrupted Action 3: Free Pasifika-Free West Papua" which contains support for the Papuan people and every detail in the performance is a symbol of Melanesian sub-racial position.

Based on the above facts on the internationalization of issues, the article is to discuss Indonesian diplomacy in dealing with the Papuan problem. The analysis is implementing the strengths, weaknesses, advocacy and challenges (SWAA) model of Indonesian diplomacy. The model is different to the SWOT (Strength, Weakness, Opportunity and Threat) analysis, where the first includes elements of advocacy in addition to constraint factors that pose a threat in policy implementation. The analysis on "Advocacy" provides a better evaluation on program implementation as well to review diplomatic success rates (Erianti & Djelantik, 2019). The SWAA analysis is applied to provide a better understanding of input from governments, non-governments and individuals, in addition to focusing on various settings and obstacles.

Literature Review

Diplomacy remains a significant part of the government, carried out by diplomats as official agents of diplomacy, which processes materials and locations, interactions as well as negotiating and signing treaties and agreements. Diplomacy is carried out between countries, through diplomatic interactions that are assumed to take place within the framework of high-level politics between countries. This interaction allows legitimizing recognition as a partner, thus excluding the role of other non-sovereign actors (Jackson, 2018). To analyze diplomacy by a non-state actor, the concept of para diplomacy is implemented in this discussion. The significance of *para diplomacy* is increased in democratic countries, as acknowledgment of freedom of speech and freedom of thought. There has been a lot of discussion regarding the rise of non-governmental "new" diplomatic actors, including by provincial/state representatives within the state.

Para diplomacy is defined as the direct involvement of the federal state or sub-state in international relations. Other terms that have the same meaning are *Multilayered Diplomacy*, *sub-state diplomacy* and *Intermestic Affairs*. The latter concept shows an increasing trend towards the internationalization of domestic issues that require international attention. Para

diplomacy occurs when a group is within the state, or a government outside the central government. For example, the provincial government of Quebec in Canada, mandates a person, often a Minister, to negotiate or engage in relations with the outside world, and to defend the interests of the parties it represents directly with foreign actors.

The actor of para diplomacy could be a sovereign state, a federated state, a non-governmental organization, or a business sector. Para diplomacy is the same as ordinary diplomacy with the big difference that the actor is not an envoy of the central government and his status is not recognized by international law. Para diplomacy actor cannot be a full member of an international organization or be a signatory to international treaties. However, the actor could participate in international negotiations, be involved in international organizations, and be part of national delegates. In the case of Quebec and Catalonia, the negotiators became part of the Canadian government delegation (Paquin, 2018). The issues discussed in para diplomacy include all political, economic, socio-cultural, and human rights violations.

Para diplomacy concerns security matters, particularly related to the border issues. Although not a new phenomenon, discussions have intensified since the 1960-1970s, in reaction to globalization, when provincial governments outside the central government had wider representation abroad. Therefore, para diplomacy is differently because it has the basic purpose of constructing and imposing the national identity of minority groups by means of various international actions abroad. The main goal of para diplomacy is to fight for political independence abroad and gain international recognition as a country. In the era of globalization, a Province or Federal State plays an international role and carries out various efforts to promote trade, investment, cooperation, and partnership with other countries. The goal of local governments is to promote development by exploring and helping their partners facing similar problems to join forces to achieve solutions more easily. Para diplomacy explores opportunities with international organizations that offer assistance programs for local development (Paquin, 2018). Related to the issues, this paper discusses the involvement of the Free Papua Organization (OPM) as an actor of para diplomacy to fight for West Papuan independence.

The SWAA (Strength, Weakness, Advocates, Adversaries) analysis model, or strengths, weaknesses, advocacy and threats, is suitable to be implemented in analyzing diplomacy as an element of government policy. SWOT (Strength, Weakness, Opportunity and Threat), is better known in the world of business management to analyze a project or business speculation. (Friesner, 2011). Meanwhile, the SWAA analysis incorporates elements of advocacy in addition to the constraints that pose a threat to diplomacy. The inclusion of advocacy elements is more in evaluating aspects that have been implemented to increase the level of success of diplomacy. In reviewing diplomacy, SWAA analysis is used to better understand the strengths, weaknesses, adversary and advocacy that has been obtained from government, non-government and individual. In addition, the review is also focused on various challenges and obstacles faced in implementing various policies. Montanari and Bracker (1986) stated that SWAA analysis makes an organization have a strategic plan not to do anything that can harm the organization. The SWAA concept can help analyze the handling of problems related to diplomacy, because it can map every problem that occurs from an organization. SWAA analysis makes it easy to find solutions so that an organization's problems can be resolved. (Pramushinta, 2014).

Research Method

A structured and elaborated research methodology is applied for this research. The concept of diplomacy and para diplomacy discussed and implemented in the case of Indonesia and OPM. As the purpose of diplomacy is to obtain and increase international support, the discussion will address the efforts of Indonesia and OPM to pursue foreign policy's interests.

Furthermore, a diplomatic analysis is provided on each actor's strength, weakness, adversary and advocacy. Analysis on strength would be focused on diplomatic modality, and in this case is focused on the support of the UN and the US. Discussion on the UN is the most important as the most important provider of legal basis for national establishment and recognition. Beside diplomatic support from ASEAN, OIC and IMO, the discussion on the US support is also significant as a great power with economic, political and military strength. Discussion on weakness would be related to internal problems such as various violations of human rights that happened since the land of Papua integrated as Indonesia's province. The analysis would be on how human rights issues had hindered Indonesia's diplomacy, but used by the OPM to increase international support and sympathy. Analysis on advocacy would be focused on international support of external actors especially on human rights violations. Lastly, the analysis on adversaries would be focused on the internationalization of the issue of Papua.

Results and Analysis

Strength; Diplomatic Support from the United Nations (UN) and the United States of America (USA)

Since the beginning of the implementation of the *Pepera* in 1969, Indonesia's strength has been the role of the United Nations which supports the Indonesian political position on the issue. Another support is from the US, a great power with its global sphere of influences. The US support was in return to Indonesia's economic concession in the exploitation and exploration of natural resources in Papua since 1967. PT Freeport Indonesia (PTFI), a US based company is the owner and manager of PTFI is an affiliate of Freeport-McMoRan Copper & Gold Inc and PT Indonesia Asahan Aluminium (Persero Inalum). The company mines, processes and explores ores containing copper, gold, and silver in Mimika Regency. By supporting Indonesia, the US can maintain a mining business interest and make substantial business profits.[‡]

Indonesia's strength is also supported by membership in several regional and global organizations. The first is membership as a non-permanent member of the United Nations security Council (UNSC) and held a chairmanship in 2020. Indonesia, as the 16th world's biggest economy, is also a member of the G-20, a global forum of developed countries that control the world economy. In 2022 Indonesia led the forum which consists of 19 developed economies plus the European Union, controls at least 80 percent of total trade and 90 percent of the world's gross national product. Indonesia also from 2020 became a member of the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC), which is possible to play a greater role and contribute to tackling human rights violations around the world.[§]

At the regional level, Indonesia was an important country that originated the establishment of ASEAN in 1968, and held a presidency in 2023. As a significant actor in the region, Indonesia also has credibility and capacity in resolving regional conflicts. Another position in Indonesia is as a member of the International Maritime Organization (IMO), based in London. As a member, Indonesia has the opportunity to be involved in determining policies that are very influential on maritime issues. Indonesia as an archipelagic country with its vast waters, could be directly involved in maintaining the creation of safety and security of international shipping. Indonesia could also play a role in creating international shipping lanes that are free from the challenge of transnational crime and reduce the threat of environmental

[‡] PT Freeport Indonesia, <https://ptfi.co.id/en>, accessed on April 16, 2023.

[§] UN News, <https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/10/1129457#:~:text=The%20full%20membership%20of%20the%20current%20Council%20is,Emirates%2C%20United%20Kingdom%2C%20United%20States%2C%20Uzbekistan%2C%20and%20Venezuela>, accessed on April 16, 2023.

damage. In November 2019, Indonesia was re-elected as a member of the IMO Category C Board for the 2020-2021 period. The IMO category C council is representative of countries that have a particular interest in sea freight and reflects a geographically equitable division of representatives.

In addition, Indonesia is also the fourth largest populated country in the world, with a moderate Muslim population that constitutes the majority. This position allows Indonesia to play a role in the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC). These facts demonstrate Indonesia diplomatic ability, as well as playable support in tempering West Papua's interests and efforts to gain independence.

Weaknesses; Various Unresolved Human Rights Violations

The weakness of Indonesian diplomacy is that there are frequent violations of human rights in Papua with an incomplete resolution process. During the struggle for Papuan independence, approximately 30,000 Papuans were killed by the Indonesian military. The New Order used a security approach with the Indonesian National Army (TNI) being the frontline. The Indonesian National Police (POLRI) is also involved in dealing with domestic security issues caused by the OPM and other separatist movements. During the enactment of the Military Operations Region (MOR) as many as 45,000 personnel and several hundred others have been stationed on the Papua New Guinea border.

Human Rights Watch reported that as many as 500,000 Papuans have been systematically deprived of their lives, and thousands more have experienced racial discrimination, arbitrary arrest, torture, imprisonment, and rape. The Indonesian Human Rights Commission (Komnas HAM) has gathered evidence of gross human rights violations by Indonesian security forces in three key areas in Papua, namely Wasior, Wamena, and Paniai. In addition to asking the UN Human Rights Council to produce an actual report on Papua, recommended that human rights violations end completely.

Another weakness is the exploitation and exploration of Papua's environment and natural wealth by various foreign companies. Local communities are victimized by environmental damage. Papua's natural wealth is dredged not for the benefit of the Papuan indigenous population, but is enjoyed more by foreign companies. The existence of PTFI which has been operating since 1967, benefitted more to foreign companies rather than the local population. The cooperation contract began with Indonesia's urgent need to obtain foreign investment, and PTFI was the company that invested in it at the beginning of the New Order. In 1972, President Soeharto named the city built in stages by PTFI under the name Tembagapura. However, PTFI's operationalization caused environmental problems such as the impact of mine waste disposal or tailings and high sedimentation in the Ajkwa River. Environmental damage occurs because of the absence of tailings reservoirs along the Ajkwa River in Mimika Regency. The environmental damage has the potential to trigger a loss of Rp.185 trillion which is the value of the ecosystem damaged by PTFI's activities. Tailings are caused because of the entire dredged and cultivated soil, only 3 percent contains minerals, while the rest is disposed of. The abundance of PTFI tailings causes water pollution and damage to forests and sago plantations. In addition, PTFI also uses protected forests without a permit.

Another weakness of Indonesian diplomacy was due to instability within the country. For example, the security conditions caused by bombings by terrorists such as Jamaah Islamiyah and supporters of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) or the Islamic State (IS) that occurred for a decade. Other conditions related to security conditions after the legislative elections, presidential elections, and regional head elections (*pilkada*) which were marked by demonstrations had hindered Indonesia's public diplomacy. The Indonesian diplomats are prevented from convincing the international community, especially regarding the domestic security situation. The large number of demonstrations that led to violence and the destruction

of public facilities also created difficulties to build a positive image. This condition jeopardized Indonesian diplomacy when introducing and winning the support not only over the issue of Papua, also of palm oil exports, and to convince investors. According to the intermestic concept, diplomacy to acquire international support requires a stable domestic security image. Therefore, diplomacy failed without the support of positive political and economic conditions at domestic level.

Advocation on Human Rights Violations

Advocacy is a number of actions designed to draw people's attention to an issue, and control policymakers to find solutions. Advocacy also contains legal and political activities that can influence the form and practice of legal application. Initiatives to advocate need to be organized, initiated strategically, supported by information, communication, approach, and mobilization (Flowers et al., 2000). There are several forms of advocacy, namely litigation/non-litigation (inside/outside the court), Case/non-case advocacy, advocacy for organizing legislation, and advocacy for the fulfillment of human rights, political, economic, social, cultural.** In the context of Papua, advocacy is given for cases of human rights violations, and the fulfillment of political, economic, and socio-cultural rights.

To respond to various demonstrations by the OPM's supporters and sympathizers, the central government generally deployed military forces. The argument is that a soft approach to the independence movement could encourage other separatist movements in other parts of the nation. Meanwhile, various armed pro-independence groups have carried out sporadic attacks, especially those targeting military and police forces. Both parts, the government and armed pro-independence groups are also involved in human rights violations including extrajudicial killings, kidnappings, and hostage-taking. However, human rights violations towards the OPM would require various advocacy efforts, which are commonly practiced by international non-governmental organizations.

Amnesty International (AI) is actively advocating the OPM for issues of extrajudicial killings, and various serious human rights violations committed by security forces. During two decades since the 1998 reforms in Indonesia, AI has often received reports of suspected unlawful killings by security forces in Papua and West Papua Provinces. Murders occur primarily in the context of excessive use of force when facing demonstrations, carrying out law enforcement efforts, or dealing with individuals who commit law violations. In 2020, AI reported at least 19 cases of extrajudicial killing by security forces with a total 30 victims. Similar incidents repeatedly occurred during the first three months in 2021, with four cases and six killed victims.††

The AI report also noted the government granted limited access to international human rights monitoring organizations wishing to visit Papua. Another report also in regards to the demonstration of minimal tolerance for freedom of expression. The majority of cases occurred in the context of demand for independence or referendums. Extrajudicial killings often occur when security forces use excessive force to handle peaceful demonstrations, riot incidents, and attempts to arrest criminal suspects, or as a form of personal misconduct by security forces. The second category related to extrajudicial killings by security forces addressed to political activities. Extrajudicial killing occurred when security forces face politically peaceful demonstrations, especially flag-raising ceremonies or religious gatherings on certain anniversaries. Investigations into reports of extrajudicial killings by security forces in Papua are rare. There is no independent, effective, and impartial mechanism to deal with public

** <https://www.kompasiana.com/linfau/572f443ac6afbdbb09e74a30/apa-itu-advokasi?page=all>, accessed on August 5th, 2020.

†† <https://www.amnesty.id/laporan-amnesty-international-2020-21-represi-dan-impunitas-terus-menghantui-penegakan-ham-di-indonesia/>, accessed on June 11th, 2023.

complaints about human rights violations by security forces, including criminal acts that constitute human rights violations.^{††}

Another advocacy conducted by the National Commission on Human Rights (Komnas HAM). The commission has made efforts to resolve cases of human rights violations in Papua. For example, protests in various cities in Papua, West Papua^{§§}, and several cities in Indonesia against racism, intimidation, violence, arrests that took place during September 2019 caused many casualties.

Advocacy cooperation has been carried out between civil society organizations and Komnas HAM, and found data on 72 victims in Papua and 104 in West Papua.^{***} In October 2018, Komnas HAM as a form of support made Papua a Land of Peace, based on Law Number 7 of 2012 concerning handling social conflicts. Komnas HAM also conducted a study with other stakeholders in Papua to respond to social conflicts. The Papua Representative Komnas HAM Office together with the Regional Leadership Communication Forum (Forkopimda) in a joint meeting at the Papua Regional Police demanded the local government to form a rapid response team to deal with social conflicts. Upon this request, Deputy Governor of Papua, Klemen Tinal formed an assistance team.^{†††}

In October of 2019. The Papuan People's Assembly signed a cooperation agreement with the National Leadership Council of the Indonesian Advocates Association (Peradi) chaired by a Lawyer, Luhut MP Panggaribuan. The aim of cooperation is to strengthen the Papuan People's Assembly (MRP) to carry out its duties to protect the rights of indigenous peoples and indigenous Papuans. The cooperation between MRP and Peradi is significant, considering the large number of Papuans who are dealing with legal issues. Cooperation is focused on advocating efforts on civil and political rights issues as well as economic, social, and cultural rights. Cooperation is also related to government policies involving the private sector in the management of forest products, mining, and plantations. However, the policy failed to contribute to development in Papua and instead led to the clearing of forests that disregarded the rights of indigenous peoples. Unfortunately, the policy led to various agrarian conflicts.

In July 2020, Amnesty International Indonesia (AII) together with 29 organizations issued an urgent statement to the Indonesian government to clarify the existence of political detainees (Tapol) Papua amid Covid-19. The Papuan political detainees were not released, which ignored requirements of the Ministry of Law and Human Rights (Kemenkumham) to release detainees after the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic.^{†††} Thirty organizations also called on the government to unconditionally release prisoners, detainees and activists imprisoned on charges of treason and peaceful expression of opinions. The demand is in accordance with the fulfillment of the right to health guaranteed in Article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). The covenant states that "the prevention, treatment and control of epidemics, endemic, occupational diseases and other diseases" are part of the right to health.

^{††} Amnesty International, Sudah, kasi Tinggal Dia Mati, Pembunuhan dan Impunitas di Papua.

<https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/ASA2181982018Indonesian.pdf>, accessed on August 6th, 2020.

^{§§} Until 2022, the Papua Province have divided into 4 provinces; Northwestern Papua, Mountains Papua, Central Papua, and Southern Papua. <https://indonesiabaik.id/infografis/papua-barat-daya-jadi-provinsi-ke-38-indonesia>, accessed on May 29th, 2023.

^{***} Komnas HAM RI, Komitmen Tuntaskan Problem Papua, Komnas Konsolidasi Antarlembaga,

<https://www.komnasham.go.id/index.php/news/2019/11/16/1251/komitmen-tuntaskan-problem-papua-komnas-konsolidasi-antarlembaga.html>, accessed on August 10th, 2020.

^{†††} <https://www.komnasham.go.id/index.php/news/2018/10/18/1075/respon-atas-maraknya-konflik-sosial-di-papua.html>, accessed on August 5th, 2023.

^{†††} Suara Papua.com, 30 Organisasi Desak Pempus Perjelas Keberadaan Tapol Papua,

<https://suarapapua.com/2020/04/03/30-organisasi-desak-pempus-perjelas-keberadaan-tapol-papua/>, accessed on August 5th, 2020.

A total of 126 civil society organizations appealed to Korindo Group and POSCO International Indonesia, to respect land and human rights defenders in Papua Province. The appeal is released on July 4, 2020, demanding that it immediately prevent the worsening of human rights violations related to all activities of Korindo Group and POSCO International.^{§§§} The Civil Organization explained that the death of Papuan farmer Marius Betera (MB) on May 16, 2020, highlighted a pattern of violence and intimidation of communities and individuals who voiced complaints about rejecting company activities or demanding rights as guaranteed by the 1945 Constitution.

Another advocacy was carried out by human rights lawyer Veronica Koman, who is accused of provoking unrest in Papua. These facts demonstrate Indonesia's diplomatic ability, as well as playable support in tempering West Papua's interests and efforts to gain independence.^{****} Koman is protected by the Australian Government and received the Sir Ronald Wilson Human Rights Award from the Australian Council for International Development (ACFID). The award is for Koman's services for advocacy, investigation, and documentation of cases of human rights violations in West Papua. The High Commission on Human Rights (UNHCHR) together with the Australian government also encouraged Indonesia to drop all allegations against Koman and to protect freedom of expression.

Other advocacy efforts are carried out through strengthening the capacity of advocates in Papua. On July 12, 2020, a Legal Advocacy seminar was held by the Iwatali Foundation which actively assists and strengthens the capacity of Church institutions in Papua. The seminar was attended by activists, Church youth leaders, students, and women leaders. The goal is that activists can deepen their ability to advocate for the community.^{††††} Various advocacy efforts have been made by international institutions and individuals in supporting human rights in Papua as well as the right to express opinions freely.

Adversary; the Internationalization of the Issues

Indonesia diplomacy challenged various efforts to balance the lobby of OPM at the UN, in addition to reducing MSG support. OPM para diplomacy has been carried out through a series of lobbying of international institutions on the basic argument that the independence of every nation including Papua has been regulated in the preamble to the 1945 Constitution.

OPM also considers Indonesia to be in violation of article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political and Economic Rights, social and cultural, as promulgated in Law No. 15 of 2005 (Sipol) and Law No. 11 of 2005 (Ecosob). This legal basis justifies Indonesia's efforts to fight for the independence of the Palestinian, but instead opposes Papua's political rights. Indonesia had also made various counter-efforts to para diplomacy by the leader of the political wing of the ULMWP Free Papua Movement, Benny Wenda. Wenda attended and visited various groups at the UN-SU and invited the UN human rights commissioner to send a team of investigators to Papua.

In July 2019, Oxford City Council in the UK, rewarded Benny Wenda a freedom of the city of Oxford.^{††††} Although the British government has announced "has no bearing on UK government policy" and it does not support Papuan independence, however, this award

^{§§§} Suara Papua.com, Ratusan Organisasi Minta Korindo dan Posco Menghormati Pembela Lahan dan HAM, <https://suarapapua.com/2020/07/08/ratusan-organisasi-minta-korindo-dan-posco-menghormati-pembela-lahan-dan-ham/>, accessed on August 5th, 2020.

^{****} <https://www.dw.com/id/veronica-koman-pengacara-yang-menolak-menyerah-tentang-papua/a-50935431>, accessed on August 10th, 2020.

^{††††} Jubi.co.id, Portal Berita tanah papua, Kemampuan dokumentasi atasi kebuntuan advokasi, <https://jubi.co.id/kemampuan-dokumentasi-atasi-kebuntuan-advokasi-papua/>, accessed on August 5th, 2020.

^{††††} Detik.com, Oxford Beri Penghargaan Benny Wenda, Inggris Tegaskan Dukung NKRI, <https://news.detik.com/berita/d-4629432/oxford-beri-penghargaan-benny-wenda-inggris-tegaskan-dukung-nkri>, accessed on August 10, 2020.

considerate as a success of ULMWP to obtained international public support. More important than just an award is the coverage is a propaganda and a sign of mass and social media support to OPM interests.

Internationalization is also carried out by OPM activists in a number of countries through actions to raise the *Morning Star flag*, on the anniversary of the declaration day of the West Papua political manifesto every December 1. Various activities are put together through the hashtag *#GlobalFlagRaising* on social media. For example, residents in a town of Warrnambool in Australia's, always celebrated December 1 for the last 10 years as Papua's independence day. In addition, a number of citizens formed the Australian West Papua Association, as in South-Western Victoria. In September 2019, Benny Wenda was present at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) to lobby the human rights commissions to visit Papua. The mission is to gather first hand information regarding human rights violations. §§§§

Indonesian public diplomacy towards Southern Pacific countries conducted through developing cooperation and providing technical assistance. Indonesia increased economic cooperation with Vanuatu as well as provided assistance in applied technology, training, scholarships, agriculture, and animal husbandry. Indonesia further provided USD 2 million in foreign aid when Vanuatu was affected by the Hurricane Pam (Cyclone Pam) disaster that hit the countries in the Pacific region. Nevertheless, Indonesia's public diplomacy efforts towards Vanuatu have not succeeded in increasing full support. As an indication of the failure is Vanuatu's consistency supporting the OPM. In the Pacific Islands Forum, the Republic of Vanuatu asked the members to support a resolution on the West Papuans' right of self-determination to be presented at the 74th session of the UN General Assembly, in September 2019. ***** In 2019, Vanuatu called on the UN to investigate and demand a process of self-determination. In addition, a number of countries in the South Pacific continue to support Papuan independence.

Indonesia Diplomacy versus OPM *Para diplomacy*

Based on the above SWAA analysis, Indonesian diplomacy still has many weaknesses, in addition to the increasingly strong OPM's para diplomacy in rallying international political support. Three factors that cause the weakness of Indonesian diplomacy are the implementation which is still dominated by state actors and does not involve non-state actors. The success of diplomacy requires the increasing involvement of non-state actors in supporting foreign policy goals. The government acts as the main and first actor to design, initiate and implement various programs to reach the public in the target country. The government also provides budgets and involves other actors, including the media, who can assist in financing various initiatives to build a positive image. Indonesian diplomacy still places the government as the only actor in designing, initiating, running, and financing various communication and public diplomacy programs. On the other hand, OPM is active in rallying support from various institutions, government and non-government, individuals, and mass-media at home and abroad, in supporting the ideals of struggle and independence.

The second reason is the unprofessionalism of Indonesia's diplomatic strategy. Technical assistance to Pacific nations was limited in number and was not followed by providing further information about Indonesia, such as cultural diversity and wealth, post-reform socio-political situation, which were very different from the conditions in the New Order Era (1966-1998). Other weaknesses include a lack of engagement, such as establishing cooperation on non-traditional issues such as climate change, development, natural disasters, and energy. Indonesia

§§§§ <https://www.tempo.co/abc/4769/benny-wenda-lobi-pbb-australia-terus-pantau-situasi-papua>, accessed on May 31st, 2023.

***** Unrepresented Nations and People Organization (UNPO), and West Papua: Vanuatu Asks for International Support for Right to Self-Determination, <https://unpo.org/article/21026>, accessed on May 31st, 2023.

also has a lack of involvement in education and to develop the economy. Technical training did not involve participants from MSG members.

International media have had a lack of publication on changes and improvements in conditions in Indonesia after the reform era. Lack of news management led to negative images of Indonesia, such as conditions in Papua. The condition when Papua was under the Military Operations Area (DOM) was different to President Joko Widodo's era with massive infrastructure projects in the Provinces. Another negative image is Indonesia that are centralized and militaristic, and led by an authoritarian President. Indonesian diplomacy has lacked of public diplomacy to inform developments under Joko Widodo presidency since 2014. To further develop the province, the current president has divided the province into four; Southern, Central, Mountains, and Western Papua.⁺⁺⁺⁺ In addition, human rights issues were also given much attention as well as defending victims and providing support for perpetrators of violations. Indonesia applied the principle of "equality before the law", however, impunity is still applied to security forces. Another issue is the protection of the environment, and to develop human resources. Scholarships were provided to students to continue study at home and abroad.

Another reason for strong international public support for OPM is the open flow of information. Any information related to human rights violations can be published by international media in real time. Another weakness of Indonesian diplomacy is overconfidence in international community support. Overconfidence was due to the position as a big country, supported by its strategic role in regional organizations such as the Association of Southeast Asian nations (ASEAN). Indonesia has become less active in establishing communication especially to international NGOs.

Indonesia also has weaknesses in international news management, especially in the context of mainstream media. Response to the news was limited to broadcasting rebuttals. For example, the government publication entitled: "No Genocide in West Papua" (2016), that considered as ineffective. Another weakness related to the late timeline. For example Vanuatu, since 2013 has been aggressively reporting human rights violations in Papua (Sabir, 2018). The Indonesian diplomacy instead formed the Indonesian Melanesian Brotherhood (Melindo) on October 7, 2015 in Ambon, followed by held the Melanesian Cultural Festival VI on October 26-30, 2015 in Kupang, NTT (Sabir, 2018). However, these activities lacked the benefits, especially in Pacific countries, where the issue of Papuan independence obtained an abundance of support.

Conclusion

The para diplomacy by the OPM is more successful in building and increasing international support for Papuan independence. The weakness of Indonesian diplomacy is due to the lack of optimal diplomatic strategy, both in the dimensions of news management, strategic communication, and relationship building. In addition, Indonesian diplomacy actors in the dimensions of news management, strategic communication and relationship building are still dominated by state actors (first track). Non-state actors still lack involvement in supporting various communication and public diplomacy programs.

Indonesian diplomacy needs to increase the role of non-state actors (second track) such as non-governmental organizations, business groups, individuals, activists, researchers, mass and social media. In the era of advances in information and communication technology (ICT), it is very important to manage information (collect, process, and utilize) for the benefit of the state. The involvement of non-state actors was absent during relationship building. To increase

⁺⁺⁺⁺ 4 Provinsi Baru Papua Hasil Pemekaran, Apa Saja?, <https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2022/11/18/16044741/4-provinsi-baru-papua-hasil-pemekaran-apa-saja>. Accessed on May 30th, 2023.

the success of public diplomacy, the government, as the main actor in multi-path diplomacy, needs to carry out a more optimal role in coordinating and communicating various efforts.

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