

Implications of Border Security, Control and Counter-Terrorism within Liboi Border along Mandera County, Kenya

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Abstract. Kenya faces border security issues at Liboi border areas of Mandera County. This study assessed the implications of border security, control and counter-terrorism in Liboi border in Mandera County of Kenya. Specifically, the study explored the influence of government security agencies, security inter-agency coordination, cross-border cooperation, and the influence of criminals' access to security weapons on counter-terrorism at Liboi border. Descriptive research design was adopted where 64 respondents were sampled using purposive and stratified random sampling techniques. These were law enforcement agencies, CBOs, and the business community. Data was collected using a structured questionnaire. Quantitative data was analyzed descriptively and inferentially using SPSS computer software while qualitative data was analyzed thematically. The study revealed that cases of terror attacks in Liboi borders have significantly reduced due to enhanced interagency coordination, reduced access to illegal arms, and cross-border cooperation among other strategies. The coefficient of determination R^2 was 0.819 for government agencies, 0.727 for interagency coordination, 0.743 for cross-border cooperation, and 0.631 for access to security weapons. Relative calm had returned in the Liboi border area due to aggressive security operations by Kenya's security agencies. The study recommended border control and security agencies to approach border security issues in a holistic manner.

Key words: border security, counterterrorism, interagency, cross-border

Introduction

Background of the Study

Border security of any country in the world is critical for the safety of citizens and their possessions. It entails measures undertaken by a state to monitor and regulate its territorial borders in order to monitor and control movement of people and goods across neighbouring states. Effective border control curtails potential illegal activities by criminal entities, such as organized terror groups. According to Meservey (2015), through border patrol and border control, countries are able to mobilize their security agencies to prevent smuggling of goods, drug trafficking and cross-border attacks from terrorist groups. Anderson (2011) further posits that border security measures involve border control policies adopted by a country or group of countries to fight against unauthorized travel or trade across its borders. Ultimately, such measures are meant to limit illegal immigration, combat transnational crime, and prevent wanted criminals from travelling.

Globally, the United State of America has invested a lot in border control and management systems, with one of the best border patrol academies and homeland security which is central in all states within America (Blank & Guiora, 2010). In a study by Brooks (2014) to understand the importance of border security in securing the US against insurgency from terrorist groups, it emerged that through effective border patrol it was possible to detect,

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deter and apprehend illegal immigrants and individuals involved in the illegal drug trade who generally entered the United States through undesignated ports of entry. One of the major issues surrounding border security in the US, for instance, is illegal immigration from Mexico. Cerone (2007) further states that the past two decades the United States has been in the forefront to secure its borders from cross-border attacks hence the country's obsession with the fight against illegal immigration.

In India, border security focuses primarily on the Bangladeshi and Pakistani borders (Benvenisti, 2009). In order to deter unlawful immigration and drug trafficking from Bangladesh, India is constructing the India-Bangladesh barrier. On the Pakistani border, the Border Security Force aims to prevent the infiltration of Indian Territory by terrorists from Pakistan and other countries in the west such as Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria among others (Estreicher, 2011). All these efforts are directed at ensuring that there are as infrequent attacks from insurgencies as possible which often put at risk the lives of people and the safety of their property.

In Africa, notable efforts have been expended to ensure that there are enough securities at the borders to help check not only the illegal immigrants and illicit goods, but most importantly deal with border insecurity, including terror activities (Geib & Siegrist, 2011). For instance, a few years back, the South African government announcement that the government would initiate processes of setting up a Border Management Agency to address counter-terrorism. This move is a clear pointer to the security threats posed by porous borders not only in South Africa as the strongest economy in Africa, but across the entire continent (Otsialo & Hajir, 2014). The threats have continued in many jurisdictions including Nigeria, Somalia, Sudan, Sierra Leone, and Ethiopia among other countries in the African region.

The quest for border integrity in Kenya is very critical and needs to be taken seriously by all stakeholders in the security sector (Beasley, 2013). This notion lends credence to the country's efforts to mobilize solidarity across all government sectors so as to secure its borders. There is documented evidence that al-Shabaab activities have in the recent past increased in Kenya especially in the wake of Kenya's intervention in Somalia in 2011 (Otsialo & Hajir, 2014). Most of the attacks have been witnessed in the country's northeastern frontier including Mandera, Wajir and Garissa counties. The ever-increasing sophistication of the operations of terror groups puts the country into heightened anxiety hence the need to craft lasting solutions to this problem. According to Murithi (2014), the current terror activities in Kenya which are largely attributed to external aggression from extremist groups should form the basis for spirited efforts by all stakeholders to address the question of terrorism in Kenya and the East African region. Mandera County forms part of the often-hit target by the insurgent groups hence the need for Liboi as the focal point for this study.

Statement of the Problem

The widespread terror-related attacks often experienced in the northern part of Kenya have worsened the situation, with locals and security agencies being the main targets of these assaults. The government's security organs are often blamed for not doing enough to address the problem. Sporadic attacks by al-Shabaab insurgencies in the area often signal the porous nature of the borders where they easily cross from neighbouring Somalia to stage their attacks. Cross-border security cooperation has also been put to test; with allegations the neighbouring Somalia may not be helping Kenya in the fight against terrorism along the Liboi border areas.

Radicalization and violent extremism have often been traced to Somalia where many young people are readily recruited and trained by al-Shabaab and sent to cause mayhem in Kenya. Additionally, security analysts have also argued that the Somalia leadership is divided on how to help Kenya in the fight against terrorism hence a clear case of poor cross-border cooperation. This study therefore assessed the implications of security, border control and

counter-terrorism along Liboi border of Mandera County in view of proposing of some strategies in improving the security of a people who live in this part of Kenya.

General Objective

The general objective of the study was to assess the implications of security, border control and counter-terrorism along Liboi border of Mandera.

Specific Objectives

The study addressed the following specific objectives:

- i. To assess the influence of government security agencies on counter-terrorism at Liboi border.
- ii. To investigate the influence of security inter-agency coordination on control of terrorism activities along Liboi border.
- iii. To analyze the effect of cross-border cooperation on counter-terrorism at Liboi border.
- iv. To explore the influence of access to security weapons by criminals on counter-terrorism at Liboi border.

Research Questions

- i. What is the influence of government security agencies on counter-terrorism at Liboi border?
- ii. How does security inter-agency coordination influence control of terrorism activities at Liboi border?
- iii. What is the effect of cross-border cooperation on counter-terrorism at Liboi border?
- iv. What is the influence of access to security weapons by criminals on counter-terrorism at Liboi border?

Justification of the Study

A country's jurisdiction is marked by the impact of its security within its borders. Thus, a country's borders serve as buffer zones and more importantly on security matters among other crucial functions. All legitimate cargo that generates revenues for the country passes through these borders. In this sense, Kenya's border entry points should be effectively guarded to facilitate the flow of trade, which is increasingly important to the national economy. This study aimed at addressing the issue of terrorism and the new methods of dealing with it. The findings may be useful in informing the government and other cross-border security partners on the best mechanisms to use in addressing the problem of terrorism not only in Kenya, but globally.

Besides the study helping national and international security stakeholders to come up with better working strategies on how to deal with terror activities at the borders, the findings may also provide great insights for policy makers in crafting better policies for managing borders and securing them for the good of the country and the citizenry. In addition, the findings of the study may be useful for adding into the pool of knowledge on border control and counter-terrorism and serve as reference for material for scholars and researchers interested in this subject.

Empirical Literature Review

Role of Government Security Agencies on Control of Terrorism Activities

Terrorism is a complex phenomenon that requires concerted efforts and a lot of both human and financial resources to deal with. For instance, intelligence information is as important as police presence when it comes to combating the problem (Müller-Wille, 2003). Although some security experts have tended to rely more on intelligence network to control terrorism activities, research has shown that intelligence should not be overestimated but rather

it should be viewed as one of a set of mechanisms in counterterrorism (Rettman, 2006). Many countries have heavily invested in modern technologies as a strategy for counterterrorism, with a view to boost protection against terrorist attacks, public engagement, enhanced intelligence gathering and bolstered international partnerships. Yet, technology alone cannot be effective as a counterterrorism measure if it is not viewed in relation to other equally important approaches (Smallwood, 2005).

Scharf (2001) has further indicated that reliable and timely intelligence is critical in counterterrorism; which can only be possible if there is a strong foundation in place to help security players accomplish this task. Strong and effective intelligence provides security experts with the opportunity to be proactive in their profession where they can be able to prevent terrorist attacks before they occur. Intelligence has also been viewed as a precondition for threat analysis, which can be critical for making long-term decisions about progressing security concerns. The cooperation between intelligence and law enforcement agencies in counterterrorism cannot be gained. According to (Lubell, 2012), terrorism has evolved over time, through improved ways of executing their attacks ostensibly aided by enhanced and widespread use of technology. In addition, terrorism is increasingly becoming a global challenge where it is integrating more with other organized criminal organizations to as to create a bigger impact. This development necessitates more cooperation of various security agencies to be able to properly and effectively counter the menace (O'Connell, 2010).

Over time, terrorist operatives have adapted to more advanced techniques and methods of counter-terror agencies and intelligence organizations and this has caused a serious challenge to the bodies charged with national and international security matters. Studies also indicate that advanced and widespread use of technology has enabled terrorists to infiltrate public space by use of computer data for their meticulous planning and communication (Waldron, 2011). This is often done through encrypted data which is sometimes beyond law enforcers' ability to decode and interpret so that they institute effective counterattack strategies. For this reason, more forensic experts may be required to help law enforcement to always stay ahead of the terrorists technologically. This can only be more possible if there is effective cooperation among various security agencies.

According to Vogel (2010), more exploitation of the cellular phones, increasing access to internet and other anonymous communication means by the terrorists have seen them communicate easily with their networks, hence making counterterrorism an enormous global challenge. This challenge has also been made more complicated by innovative communication means where for instance modern terrorists use digital photos and graphics to easily and quickly spread their clandestine activities, including propaganda materials (Lubell, 2012). Following the disruptions by counterterrorist activities, some terror organizations have demonstrated their resilience through redefining themselves to emerge stronger than before. Therefore, through regrouping, reorganization, and application of more sophisticated means of spreading their heinous activities, counterterrorism has become a big challenge. Sophistication of almost all aspects of terror operational support mechanisms calls for stronger counterterrorist strategies to deal with terrorism as a global problem.

According to Waldron (2011), the aggressive application of modern technology for information control, spread and intelligence sharing has greatly enhanced efficiency of terrorist undertakings, hence calling for more concerted efforts by all security forces to deal with. Technology is increasingly becoming more accessible to all people in the world, and this has also enhanced efficiency of terrorist activities. Easy accessibility of both technological platforms and skilled individuals to operate the technology has made it less stressful for terrorists to interact with members of the public who may be ready to be enlisted in terrorist activities due to monetary attractions (O'Connell, 2010). This scenario gives an advantage to the well-funded terrorist groups and organizations over legal terrorist counter-measures.

In order to respond to the challenges posed by modern terrorism, governments and international security partners have over time tried to craft working strategies to address this problem. In this sense, counterterrorism can be viewed as initiating actions, tactics, techniques and strategies that governments, through their military, anti-terror police units, and other security agencies, can use to address this global problem (Waldron, 2011). In order to launch adequate counterterrorist responses, it becomes logical to involve multiple security agencies as this approach makes it easier for the security players to complement one another during their operations. Counterterrorist experts have suggested that counterterrorism should not be viewed as being specific to one field or organization; rather, it must be seen to be fought with concerted efforts from several security players in society at both individual and institutional levels. For instance, private business organizations must be encouraged to share their commercial data with government security agencies such as the police, firefighters and emergency medical personnel so that terrorist attacks can be dealt with as soon as they are suspected.

Although in many instances armies have been deployed to conduct combat operations to root out terrorists especially by use of Special Forces, building a formidable counterterrorist strategy should involve multiple subsectors of society and government agencies so that a stronger force can be harnessed from different such quarters for more efficient and effective responses (Lubell, 2012). Each segment of the society or government security machinery must be viewed as complementary to the other if the war on terrorism is to be won. For instance, propaganda and brainwashing seem to lie at the core of terrorism operations; and therefore, it would be imperative to have in place a strong communication unit which can always strive to dig for relevant information related to activities of terrorism to relay to the public hence making it easier to tackle the problem. In any case, clear understanding of the profile and operations of terror organizations would increase the efficiency and effectiveness of counterterrorism (O'Connell, 2010).

Security Inter-Agency Coordination and Control of Terrorism Activities

Due to the complexity of terrorism phenomenon, effective counterterrorism would require specialized and well-organized structures and resources from all interested parties in local and cross-border security matters. At the center of counterterrorism is the protection of human lives and safety of their property. Therefore, in order to reduce vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist attacks, strict inter-agency measures must be employed (Dempsey, 2006). According to Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), this relationship should be seen in terms collaboration between government agencies such as border guards, border police, customs agents and security services especially police and the defense forces, to effectively maximize the use of resources and build a more comprehensive intelligence network for responding to terrorist threats (OECD, 2006).

According to the UN (2015), inter-agency cooperation may not require the establishment of formal oversight structures or centralized planning command area. Rather, this should be based on regular interaction and timely exchange of information between the partner agencies. The success of the collaboration is founded on mutual trust, established at the initial, broad, and multilevel interaction, including during the planning processes. UN (2015) further posits that Inter-agency cooperation is enhanced by common communication platforms, particularly information technology (IT) systems, as they facilitate the sharing of information and intelligence.

Furthermore, there should be counter-measures which involve offensive tactics to prevent terrorist activities, and this must be identified in advance to curtail more threats and perpetration of the terror groups' heinous acts. According to (Okumu and Botha, 2007), for effective execution of these procedures, it is desirable to involve local and international inter-agency cooperation so as to augment multi-agency collaboration hence leading to better

outcomes. Security experts have continued to argue that conventions and protocols must be ratified and adopted into national legislation if a stronger inter-agency relationship has to be created (Waslekar, 2007). A legally binding document would make it easier for instance, to cement a closer cross-border pact which supports mutual legal assistance among different entities and extradition of terror suspects where need be (Okumu & Botha, 2007).

Through inter-agency coordination, security experts have further argued, it is easier to institute crisis management strategies which focus on resolving and calming post-terrorist attack situations, and involve disaster and emergency management (Waslekar, 2007). According to Fluri and Johnson (2003), nurturing transnational discourse, encouraging regional collaboration, and building global counter-terrorist establishments are some of the ways by which Kenya and the world can protect itself against terrorism. Powell (2005) further posits that through a multifaceted cross-border strategy and enhanced multilateral approach, it will be possible to develop countermeasures for the emerging trend of modern terrorism. Otherwise, it will be untenable to achieve this feat if terrorism is pursued through a shallow unilateral approach where only a few players want to call the shots in counterterrorism pursuits. Effective counterterrorism strategy should simultaneously address the actual contributors to terrorism – poverty, illiteracy, illiberal education, religious fanaticism, and totalitarianism among others – and be seen to suggesting how to address them (Fluri & Johnson, 2003). To have a cross-border inter-agency arrangement would require an international legal framework that can identify, support, and direct the interests and behavior of party states towards a unified and global counterterrorism policy (Powell, 2005).

With witnessed serious terrorist attacks in Mandera County in the last few years, it will call for concerted efforts from all security apparatus to address terrorism in the county. Since mid-2013 when al-Shabaab is thought to have reorganized itself, Mandera County has experienced a number of terrorist attacks; which would call for serious cooperation between multiple government security agencies and the community to address. In November 2014 for instance, a Nairobi-bound commuter bus was attacked along the Kenya-Somalia border where 28 alleged non-Muslims were shot dead. Hardly a week later 66 quarry workers in Koromey, near Mandera town, were killed. In both killings, there emerged religious undertones, with al-Shabaab claiming responsibility and attributing the killings to an earlier operation in Mombasa to flush out terror-related criminals from mosques. Despite widespread condemnation of the Mandera attacks which were quickly attributed to the government's inability to provide adequate security to its citizens and their property, it clearly emerged that terror operatives were taking new dimensions in their attacks (Menkhaus, 2014). The local politics of Mandera and the county's exposure to Somalia through a porous border played a key role in these attacks. However, the underlying issue was that the county lacked a serious integrated border security strategy where terrorist elements could fairly easily be identified before they committed their heinous acts.

Cross-Border Cooperation and Control of Terrorism Activities

One of the most notable cross-border counterterrorism partnerships in the African region is the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnerships (TSCTP). Created in 2005 and funded and implemented in the US, the multi-faceted and multi-year initiative was intended to institute a counterterrorism pathway where many players are brought on board to launch a common front for addressing terrorist activities in the sub-Saharan region (Waldron, 2011). The TSCTP partners include Algeria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and Tunisia. This was intended to bring together different security players from these countries such as the military, law enforcement, and civilian actors and help in building their capacities to tackle terrorism across common borders of the member countries.

Although the partnership has tried to carry out its mandate to the best of its ability, numerous challenges have tended to curtail its efforts.

Despite the cooperation shown by all the member states, some of the notable impediments to the TSCTP include uneasy political environment, increased sophisticated terror activities, ethnic rebellions, and extra-constitutional actions that have often tended to interrupt work and progress with select partner countries (O'Connell, 2010). Hence, this has largely negated the partnership's set objectives. TSCTP, a US-initiated global assistance programme, continues to have significant impact on West and Central African states, countries which are its major partners. Through this initiative, the Lake Chad region countries namely Cameroon, Niger, Chad, and Nigeria have remained actively involved in countering Boko Haram insurgents and ISIS-West Africa. This has also seen these countries engaged in coordinating forces with Benin with the intention of coming up with a multinational joint task force to deal with terrorists' activities in the region (Lubell, 2012). Despite the concerted efforts exhibited through this move, the activities of Boko Haram continue to dominate Nigeria, with recent reported cases of mass abductions of school children featuring heavily in the media.

Another cross-border partnership was created in Sahel which involved five regional partners Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger to form the G-5 Sahel Joint Force to combat al-Qaeda and ISIS fundamentalists operating in what is called tri-border region. In 2016 other four Sahel states namely Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Senegal joined the Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund which provided comprehensive assistance to targeted partners. The fund was meant to be complementary to the efforts of TSCTP and seeks to produce tangible results in a range of counterterrorism-related fields. However, all these efforts are have not born a lasting solution to terrorist activities in the West African region. This therefore generally means that further empirical studies are needed to help clearly understand the relationship between border security and counterterrorism, with a focus on the African context.

Another cross-border partnership for countering terrorism is the Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism (PREAC). Established in 2009, the PREAC is a US-backed framework meant to capacity-build border security stakeholders and to enhance their cooperation in order to effectively address terror-related activities in the east African region (O'Connell, 2010). Direct stakeholders include the military, law enforcement, and civilian actors, who are supposed to spearhead criminal justice processes, defense and financial sector transformations. Through this initiative, the member states are supposed to promote collaborative training and membership initiatives that underscore respect for human rights, the rule of law, and good governance (Vogel, 2010). As part of the broader agenda of this partnership, joint training is supposed to be carried out for Kenyan, Tanzanian, and Ugandan law enforcement experts so as to augment their skills in their professions. Furthermore, the efforts are geared towards enhancing and encouraging regional coordination and cooperation, protect shared borders, and respond to terrorist occurrences in a responsible and effective manner. The PREAC membership includes Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Somalia. In addition, Burundi, Comoros, Rwanda, Seychelles, South Sudan, and Sudan serve as inactive members of the partnership.

Despite the elaborate stipulation of the roles of PREAC, not much is known about the initiative, and little efforts are actively directed towards addressing terror-related activities. This then puts to question the seriousness with which cross-border cooperation is considered as a proactive measure to deal with terror activities along border points. In relation to Mandera border security issues, most clans in the country have physical presence in or close blood ties with clans in neighbouring Somalia or Ethiopia (McKnight, 2014). Contrary to popular expectations that these clans spanning across borders should live in harmony, often they are competing for resources hence often causing conflicts. Furthermore, local territorial

competition often tends to engineer disharmony among the people living near the borders hence encouraging mushrooming of some elements of terrorist sympathizers (Alston, 2011). Consequently, cooperation would be highly desirable if terror activities are to be effectively dealt with. However, this does not always happen as communities here are sometimes further polarized based on political completion or other sectarian interests. Such scenarios for instance that led to the establishment of a powerful twenty-one-man Garre Council of Elders in 2012, which drew membership from all the clans in Mandera (Otsialo & Hajir, 2014).

Access to Security Weapons by Criminals and Control of Terrorism Activities

Terrorism activities have often been associated with easy access of small arms and light weapons by criminals. This enables the terrorist groups to hit their targets with relative ease hence achieving their objectives of spreading terror in their targeted countries or areas. For instance, a number of terror-related attacks have been linked to easy acquisition and trafficking of materials for making improvised explosive devices (Ombati, 2016). According to the Small Arms Survey (2008), the rapid increase of small arms presupposes an upsurge in their production, trade and consumption within a given area. Mustafa and Vendley (2010) postulate that the proliferation of small arms and light weapons has been a thorny issue in the African region, leading to the killing of many civilians and massive displacements of communities. These weapons have been particularly used in fatal conflicts in Sudan, Uganda, Rwanda, Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Somalia, and Sierra Leone among other African countries. According to Transparency International (TI), weak cross-border laws and corrupt security systems operating along the borders are some of the contributing factors to proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the sub-Saharan region (TI, 2010).

Furthermore, insufficient and ineffective border control mechanisms and marginal police presence, especially in the northern part of Kenya, are to blame for sneaking in such weapons from the neighbouring troubled countries such as Somalia and Sudan (Ombati, 2016). Increased presence of small arms and light weapons in Kenya has particularly been linked to high levels of corruption in many government agencies, and especially in the police service. According to the Transparency International Bribery Index of 2011, the Kenya police service was ranked as the most corrupt government institution in the country (TI Kenya, 2011), hence the greatest contributor to border insecurity. It has been alleged that porous borders make it possible for the weapons to easily change ownership among fighters, security institutions and war racketeers (UN, 2008). Inadequate policing along the vast border areas in the northern part of Kenya especially among the pastoralist communities leaves a lot of free movements across the borders hence making it easier for the terrorists and their sympathizers to smuggle guns into the country (Small Arms Survey, 2011).

According to Singo, Kamenju, Nderitu, and Wairagu (2003), the ease with which most residents in border areas can procure a gun has tended to create an impression among some groups of people that it is a right to possess a gun. Inter-ethnic conflicts in these areas have worsened the situation, with some communities craving to own weapons to protect their lives and safeguard their property (Ndonga, 2013). Often some of these weapons end up in major cities through transit routes hence entrenching terrorist activities and other related criminal activities. Okoth-Yogo (2012) further argues that small arms and light weapons have been used in various criminal activities such as armed robberies, intrastate and interstate feuds, armed rebel activities, and terrorism. The weapons have also been used to facilitate drug trafficking, smuggling of gold and other mineral substances, hence generally causing a high sense of fear among the border communities. In the northern part of Kenya, several violent crimes, including those associated with violent extremism, have been linked to easy acquisition of arms by the residents living here (Mustafa & Vendley, 2010). Mustafa and Vendley (2010) further postulate that porous borders have also contributed to influx of refugees into the country, who eventually

pose serious security threats such as those related to violent extremism. Based on the aforementioned arguments, it is important to understand the influence of proliferation of small arms and light weapons on terrorism in Kenya, with Liboi border in Mandera County taken as a case study.

Theoretical Framework

The study was guided by social control theory and border security theory. Both of these theories were critical in relating the relationship between border security activities and counter-terrorism in border areas.

Social Control Theory

Founded in 1950 by Travis Hirschi, Social Control theory best explains the relationship between social behavior and the consequences of those behaviors. The theory basically focuses on how to control social behavior in order for individuals, social groups or communities to meet certain expectations. In setting out regulations, it is anticipated that certain groups of individuals can be compliant with societal rules, including those to do with controlling border security to curb terrorism. According to Adler et al. (1991), commitment by individuals or institutions charged with security responsibilities to certain rules and expectations endears them to the rest of the community members who look up to them for protection. In the case of border security and counterterrorism activities in Liboi border, security institutions manning the border are expected to behave in a certain way in order to guarantee safety of the communities living along the border as well as safeguarding their property.

Often security agencies have been accused of being negligent in their duties hence resulting into the influx of unauthorized people into the country where some of them end up being terrorists. On the basis of this theory, if security agencies operate within the rule of law and undertake their duties diligently, then such things as illegal cross-border migrations or movements would substantially be reduced hence curbing terrorist activities. On the other hand, for those harboring the intention of breaking the law by propagating terrorist activities or spreading propaganda, they would be discouraged from contemplating further heinous activities lest they face severe punishment. Social control theory is driven by two perspectives namely macro and micro sociological views of control.

Macro sociological perspective deals with formal systems such as legal institutions such as the courts and correctional facilities including prisons. According to Conklin (1995), macro sociological control systems can be either positive or negative. They are considered positive if they are seen as controlling rule breaking behavior through social guidance. On the other hand, they are considered negative if they are seen to be promoting oppressive or deceitful conducts by individuals occupying high offices. In the context of security agencies' work at border points and proliferation of small arms and light weapons for instance, if they are doing their work as they should, then we will not expect any illegal smuggling of the weapons which was likely to contribute to terrorist activities. However, if the security services decide to behave in a rogue manner, then such dangerous weapons can easily illegally get their way into the country through the borders hence jeopardizing people's lives through possible terrorist activities.

Hirschi (1950) further posits that there are four societal bonds that encourage individuals' conformity to the rule of law. The first bond entails attachment to institutions or one's parents. This would mean that security agents who have developed a sense of close attachment to their work are likely to undertake their responsibilities with dedication and decorum hence avoiding controversies which could lead to security breaches. This therefore means that the close attachment security personnel have to their respective work would be very critical in determining how they conduct themselves while on duty, thus creating either a positive or negative impact. Hirschi (1950) further argues that there was an association between failure to adhere to the rule of law by security personnel while on duty and the level of crime expected

to be noted within their working jurisdictions. This notion would also affect the potential terrorists or other related criminals. For instance, where government security officers are lax in their work, it is likely that criminals will take advantage of the situation either through collaboration with the officers or by exploiting the loopholes in policing so that they can achieve their criminal objectives.

Hirschi further observed that the security officers' second bond involved one's dedication to adhere to the norm. An individual was then driven by such expectations as economic rewards or other social benefits such as promotions if they behaved well in their workplace. According to Conklin (1995), the greater an individual's aspirations and expectations the more that individual will endeavour to thwart criminal activities. Cases have emerged where security officers are thought to have knowingly compromised their work by allowing terrorist suspects to escape from law enforcement. In some instances, security forces have been linked to illegal activities with terror organizations, especially where there are high financial expectations from the illicit businesses run by these organizations. A case in point would be where the AMISOM troops in Somalia have been accused of colluding with al-Shabaab to run illegal charcoal business in Kisimayu and other parts of Somalia. This means that perhaps the soldiers are driven by the uncertainty they find themselves in, especially based on the fact that the government may not be compensating them adequately for their good work in keeping peace in Somalia and suppressing the activities of insurgents for the sake of peace in the east African and horn of African regions.

Regarding how to address new cases of insurgency where there is often forced recruitment, the Kenyan criminal justice system has instituted social control mechanisms to help reduce cases of radicalization in the northern frontier. For instance, the judiciary is in the forefront to impose severe penalties for those caught propagating terror activities. There is also Kenya National Counter terrorism Centre (NCTC) which deals with coordination of all counter terrorism and countering violent extremism efforts using soft approaches, anti-terror police service unit trained and charged with dealing with radicalization and violent extremism in totality.

Critics of social control theory argue that the theory has little practical solutions to radicalization and violent extremism along border areas. They for example accuse the police of lacking the capacity to institute tangible control mechanisms to deal with terrorist decisively. Often the police is viewed as either being reluctant or lacking the capacity to conduct investigations on terrorism cases. Besides, there have been cases of the police being accused of furthering terrorist groups' interests, either directly or indirectly. Weak investigation and prosecution structures have also resulted into suspects being released for lack of enough evidence to enable the courts pass sentences on terror suspects thus having direct or indirect implication to national security to planning of terrorist attack by those released under such circumstances. There is also inadequate or no sharing of vital background information within the ranks of the criminal justice system on various risk levels of offenders especially the non-terror related cases or those whose evidence on terror do not meet the threshold hence affecting the risk assessment on case-by-case basis.

Border Security Theory

Propagated by Mark B. Salter and Can E. Mutlu in 2004, border security theory postulates that inter-state cooperation is very critical in addressing cross-border security matters including terror activities. Studies indicate that collapsed states tend to have unstable security operating systems hence highly likely to affect their neighbouring countries. This situation can easily be associated with the security situation in Kenya-Somalia borders and other such areas, where the instability of Somali government continues to create uncertainty on security situation along the common borders as terror organizations cause untold suffering to

the people. The al-Shabaab terror group, for instance, is thought to have its base in Somalia where it often recruits and conducts training to its new adherents (Caporaso, 2000).

Conceptual Framework

A conceptual framework helps to illustrate in detail the relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variable. In each variable, there are sub-variables which demonstrate the measurements used to elaborate on the relationship between the predictor (independent) variables and the outcome (dependent variable) of the study. Figure 1 illustrates this diagrammatical relationship.

Independent Variables




Figure 1. Conceptual Framework of Counterterrorism in Liboi Border

Research Methodology

Research Design

The study adopted descriptive research design to accomplish its objectives. Orodho (2005) posits that descriptive research design is appropriate for allowing collection of objective information, summarization and interpretation of the same in a precise manner. Through this approach, phenomena are explained based on their social realities hence removing any possible bias in reporting of the outcomes of the study. The design was suitable for explaining the relationship between predictor variables and counterterrorism activities at Liboi border, as the outcome (dependent variable) of the study.

Target Population

Kothari (2013) defines a research population as total elements of individuals or objects sharing similar characteristics, from which the researcher intends to draw a sample from. This definition is reinforced by Saunders (2013), who posits that population is an assemblage of distinct features from which researchers can select their samples for making certain extrapolations. Since the study examined the influence of border security on counter-terrorism in Liboi border, the target population consisted of groups directly or indirectly dealing with or interested in security matters in the area. Hence, these included law enforcement agencies and community policing units, community-based organizations (CBOs), and business community organizations. These formed the study units of analysis which were identified purposively and spread in a proportionate manner. Table 1 gives a summary of the target population.

Table 1. Target Population

Category	Total Population (N)
Law enforcement Agencies	70
Community policing Units	82
Community Based on Organizations	67
Business Community Organizations	101
Total	320

Sampling Procedure and Sample Size

Purposive sampling technique was used to identify groups of respondents involved in security matters in Liboi border. Purposive sampling technique is a non-probability method through which to identify respondents with in-depth knowledge of the subject of study. The respondents were identified based on clusters namely law enforcement agencies, community-based organizations, community policing units, and the business community. Grouping of the respondents into smaller strata reduced the cost for sampling since it was easier to identify the sub-groups while at the same time significantly reducing sampling errors (Merriam, 2008).

After identifying the respondents through purposive method, stratified random sampling technique was employed to select a representative sample for each group. Stratified random sampling is a probability sampling procedure for grouping a study population into smaller non-overlapping subgroups/strata based on their unique and independent characteristics or role played in the study community. The Kathuri and Pals (1993) sampling formula of 20-30% was applied for arriving at the final sample where the lower limit of 20% was used to select 64 respondents from all the four categories. This summary is presented in Table 2.

Table 2. Sample Size

Category	Total Population (N)	Sample Size (n)
Law enforcement Agencies	70	14
Community Policing units	82	16
Community Based on Organizations	67	14
Business Community Organizations	101	20
Total	320	64

Research Instruments

A structured questionnaire was used for the collection of primary data. A questionnaire was more suitable since it provided an opportunity for gathering large information with relative ease hence saving time during fieldwork. Besides, data collection using a questionnaire made it easier for the research team to maintain confidentiality of the information shared since the respondents were not required to write their personal details, such as actual names, on the questionnaire. The questionnaire constituted both close-ended and open-ended questions to allow triangulation of quantitative and qualitative data. The questionnaire was administered mainly through face-to-face interviews. However, due to certain prevailing circumstances, such as tight work schedules, there were a few cases of drop-and-pick where blank questionnaires were distributed to the respondents and completed ones picked later.

Data Analysis Methods

Collected data was processed using both quantitative and qualitative data analysis methods. Quantitative data was analyzed using descriptive statistics with the aid of SPSS computer software. Summary of the results were presented using frequency distribution and percentage tables. Qualitative data was analyzed using thematic analysis technique where a critical assessment of each narrative response was examined using thematic interpretation in accordance with the main objective of the study and thereafter presented in narrative excerpts within the report.

Ethical Considerations

Ethical considerations were duly observed, including informed consent, confidentiality and anonymity of information during the research process. Generally, research ethics demands that all due protocol is observed, and that the participants are not in any way harmed as a result of their participation in the study. During fieldwork, the research participants were informed of their voluntary participation in the study. Besides, they were clearly informed of the purpose of the study so that they could make informed decisions before they participated.

Research Findings and Discussion

Introduction

The study assessed the implications of security, border control and counter-terrorism along Liboi border of Mandera. Specifically, the study investigated the influence of government security agencies on counter-terrorism, the influence of security inter-agency coordination on control of terrorism activities, the effect of cross-border cooperation on counter-terrorism, and the influence of access to security weapons by criminals on counter-terrorism at Liboi border. Out of the sample of 64 respondents, 52 of them managed to successfully participate in the study, which translated into 81% response rate.

Table 3. Response Rate

Category	Sample Size	Response Rate	
	Frequency (n)	Frequency (n)	Percentage (%)
Law enforcement Agencies	14	11	79
Community Policing units	16	13	81
Community Based Organizations	14	10	71
Business Community Organizations	20	18	90
Total	64	52	81

Descriptive Analysis of Independent Variables

The study focused on the influence of government security agencies, security inter-agency coordination, cross-border cooperation, and the influence of access to security weapons by criminals on counter- terrorism at Liboi border.

Government Security Agencies and Counter-terrorism at Liboi Border

Regarding the influence of government security agencies on counterterrorism at the Liboi border area, a number of propositions were used in order to further explore this variable. Table 3 presents a summary of the responses that were based on a 5-Likert scale.

Table 4. Government Security Agencies and Counterterrorism

Statements	1=strongly disagree	2=disagree	3=neutral	4=Agree	5=Strongly Agree	Total
	n(%)	n(%)	n(%)	n(%)	n(%)	n(%)
There is often a good working relationship among all security agencies	4 (8)	10 (19)	12 (23)	18 (35)	8 (15)	52 (100)
Multi-agency cooperation has yielded positive results on counterterrorism	7 (13)	12 (19)	10 (23)	19 (35)	4 (12)	52 (100)
The government is fully involved in ensuring that there is multi-agency collaboration in counterterrorism efforts	7 (13)	11 (21)	12 (23)	16 (31)	6 (12)	52 (100)
There are adequate and effective structures to enhance multi-agency partnership in counterterrorism endeavours	11 (21)	10 (19)	13 (25)	12 (23)	6 (12)	52 (100)
There are always new players coming on board to enhance efforts on counterterrorism in Liboi borders	12(23)	6 (12)	7 (13)	21 (40)	6 (12)	52 (100)

Based on the analysis on Table 4, 25 (50%) of the respondents agreed that there was often a good working relationship among all security agencies whereas 14 (27%) had a differing opinion and 12 (23%) of them maintained a neutral stand. On whether multi agency cooperation has yielded positive results on counterterrorism, 23 (47%) of the respondents concurred, 19 (32%) disagreed while 10 (23%) indicated that they neither agree nor disagreed. A more or less similar trend was noted regarding whether the government is fully involved in ensuring that there is multi-agency collaboration in counterterrorism efforts, with 22 (43%) of the respondents agreeing with this account while 18 (34%) disagreed and 12 (23%) indicated that they held a neutral ground.

There were also mixed reactions regarding whether there were adequate and effective structures to enhance multi-agency partnership in counterterrorism endeavors, with 18 (35%) of the respondents agreeing, 21 (49%) disagreeing, and 13 (25%) indicating that they were not very sure. As to whether there are always new players coming on board to enhance efforts on counterterrorism in Liboi borders, 27 (52%) of the respondents agreed, 18 (35%) disagreed, while 7 (13%) of them had neutral responses. Overall, government security agencies were actively involved in counterterrorism at Liboi border. However, based on the varied opinions from the respondents, a lot still remained to be done.

Concerning the views about the influence of multi-agency cooperation on counterterrorism in Liboi border areas and how this influenced spread of terror activities in the region, it emerged that this was an effective tool since much ground was covered, information shared, and terror activities addressed in almost real time. Multiagency approach had significantly curbed terror related activities in Liboi border areas by engaging criminals in high gear fights and helping to scuttle some of the terrorists' plans before they got to be executed. Furthermore, due to enhanced intelligence gathering as a result of multiagency cooperation and proper coordination, a number of terror suspects, sympathizers and financiers were reported to government authorities and subsequently arrested and their activities stopped.

Cooperation at various levels had also enabled the security agencies operating at the Liboi border to greatly reduce activities of the terror groups and deter those harboring such thoughts. The synergy created through multiagency operation was critical in identifying suspicious characters before they entrenched their hardcore criminal behavior and radicalized mindsets to poison the rest of the community members, especially the young people who were vulnerable to terrorist groups which often tended to entice the youth with monetary rewards. Multi Agency cooperation also ensured that there was close engagement of the locals with government security institutions to identify criminals and apprehend them before they caused major security threats. Given that multiagency cooperation approach meant involving local institutions and communities in the fight against terrorism and maintenance of safety and security, community-based organizations and the business community were given an opportunity play an active role in counterterrorism and restoration of security in the otherwise volatile border areas. This bottom-up approach in the pursuit of border security eventually had better outcomes than the top-down approach which is sometimes viewed as being out of touch with the actual situation on the ground.

This study's findings resonated with a number of previous researches. For instance, (Lubell, 2012) noted that terrorism has evolved over time, through improved ways of executing their attacks ostensibly aided by enhanced and widespread use of technology. This placed huge challenges on the government when it came to tackling the problem. In addition, terrorism is increasingly becoming a global challenge where it is integrating more with other organized criminal organizations to as to create a bigger impact. This development necessitates more cooperation of various security agencies to be able to properly and effectively counter the menace (O'Connell, 2010).

Interagency Coordination and Counter-terrorism at Liboi Border

The second objective of the study entailed to investigate the influence of security inter-agency coordination on control of terrorism activities along Liboi border. On a 5-point Likert scale, the respondents had the following to say, as summarized in Table 5.

Table 5. Interagency Coordination and Counterterrorism

Statements	1=strongly disagree	2=disagree	3=neutral	4=Agree	5=Strongly Agree	Total
	n(%)	n(%)	n(%)	n(%)	n(%)	n(%)
There is often effective and efficient inter-agency coordination to enhance counterterrorism efforts in this area	8 (12)	14 (27)	11 (21)	13 (25)	6 (12)	52 (100)
Inter-agency coordination has led to positive outcomes on counterterrorism in this area	5 (10)	18 (35)	12 (23)	12 (23)	5 (10)	52 (100)
The government is effectively involved in inter-agency coordination for desirable outcomes on counterterrorism	8 (15)	15 (29)	14 (27)	10 (19)	5 (10)	52 (100)
There are adequate and effective structures to enhance inter-agency coordination in counterterrorism activities	7 (13)	13 (25)	9 (17)	12 (23)	11 (21)	52 (100)
Apart from the government, there are players actively in inter-agency coordination for better outcomes on counterterrorism in Liboi borders	12 (23)	19 (37)	6 (12)	9 (17)	6 (12)	52 (100)

From the statistics on Table 5, the respondents had varying opinions regarding whether there is often effective and efficient inter-agency coordination to enhance counterterrorism efforts in this area. Nineteen (37%) of the respondents agreed that interagency coordination was effectively done to boost efforts in counterterrorism, 22 (39%) disagreed while 11 (21%) indicated that they neither agreed nor disagreed. Similar mixed reactions were expressed about the fact that interagency coordination has led to positive outcomes on counterterrorism in the Liboi area where 23 (45%) of the respondents disagreed, 17 (33%) agreed while 12 (23%) stood middle ground. Based on the overall responses regarding the influence of interagency

coordination on control of terrorism activities, it was evident that a lot of efforts were required to enhance coordination between security agencies working in Liboi border area.

On the general views concerning the influence of inter-agency coordination on counterterrorism in Liboi border areas, and how this influenced spread of terror activities in the region, it emerged that there was reduction of terror activities due to a much more formidable force fronted through the synergy created by all the agencies working together towards a common goal. However, there was no proper coordination, which was hindered by reluctance by the local communities and emerging sympathizers to the terrorists' course. Emerging superior technology was also enabling the criminals to always stay ahead in terms of information and counter moves hence making it a big challenge for the agencies to effectively work in a well-coordinated manner. But the region is generally peaceful courtesy of enhanced interagency coordination. Despite this development, the government needed to work extra hard to institute better counterterrorism measures through a joint approach.

Other previous studies have also demonstrated corroborating results. For instance, Menkhaus (2014) noted that despite widespread condemnation of previous Mandera attacks which were quickly attributed to the government's inability to provide adequate security to its citizens and their property, it was clear that terror operatives were taking new dimensions in their attacks. The local politics of Mandera and the county's exposure to Somalia through a porous border significantly contributed to these attacks. However, the underlying challenge was that the county lacked a serious integrated border security strategy where terrorist elements could fairly easily be identified before they committed their heinous acts.

Cross-Border Cooperation and Counter-terrorism at Liboi Border

The third objective of the study was to analyze the effect of cross-border cooperation on counter-terrorism at Liboi border. A number of propositions were used to dissect this variable where the respondents were asked questions based on a 5-point Likert scale. Table 6 provides a summary of these responses.

Table 6. Cross-Border Cooperation and Counterterrorism

Statements	1=strongly disagree	2=disagree	3=neutral	4=Agree	5=Strongly Agree	Total
	n(%)	n(%)	n(%)	n(%)	n(%)	n(%)
There is often effective and efficient cross-border cooperation to enhance counterterrorism efforts in Liboi border areas	7 (13)	13 (25)	15 (29)	11 (21)	6 (12)	52 (100)
Cross-border cooperation has led to positive outcomes on counterterrorism in this area	9 (17)	10 (19)	10 (19)	11 (21)	12 (23)	52 (100)
All the countries sharing the border are effectively collaborating in counterterrorism efforts in this area	6 (12)	12 (23)	17 (33)	11 (21)	6 (12)	52 (100)

There are well-laid down structures to enhance cross-border cooperation in counterterrorism efforts in this area	5 (10)	12 (23)	13 (25)	16 (31)	6 (12)	52 (100)
There are no more border disputes to escalate terrorist activities in Liboi border areas	12 (23)	13 (25)	16 (31)	7 (13)	4 (8)	52 (100)

Based on the statistics on Table 6, the respondents held different opinions on whether there is often effective and efficient cross-border cooperation to enhance counterterrorism efforts in Liboi border areas, with 20 (28%) disagreeing, 17 (33%) agreeing and 15 (29%) indicating that they neither agree nor disagreed. A similar trend was noted regarding the suggestion that cross-border cooperation has led to positive outcomes on counterterrorism in the Liboi area, where 23 (44%) of the respondents concurred, 19 (26%) differed and 10 (19%) had neutral views. The findings further indicated that there was no unanimous agreement that countries sharing the border are effectively collaborating in counterterrorism efforts in the Liboi area. Of the 52 respondents involved in the study, 18 (35%) of them disagreed, 17 (33%) agreed, while 17 (33%) neither agree nor disagree with this account.

Furthermore, there were varied opinions regarding the proposition that there are well-laid down structures to enhance cross-border cooperation in counterterrorism efforts in the Liboi area. Of those interviewed, 22 (43%) agreed, 17 (33%) disagreed while 13 (25%) had neutral views. It also emerged that the respondents had mixed opinions regarding whether there are no more border disputes to escalate terrorist activities in Liboi border areas, with 25 (48%) of the respondents disagreeing, 16 (31%) neither agreeing nor disagreeing while 11 (21%) agreed with this view. Overall, the findings indicated that it was not obvious that there was cross-border cooperation for the sake of dealing with terrorism activities in Liboi area. This would further imply that a lot needed to be done in order to enhance cooperation among all key security players in order to effectively deal with terrorism in Liboi border areas.

Regarding general views about the influence of cross-border cooperation on counterterrorism in Liboi border areas and how these influences spread of terror activities in the region, there was a general feeling that sometimes there was minimal or complete lack of cross-border cooperation. Furthermore, there was sometimes mistrust between security agencies from the two countries which interfered with genuine cooperation. It was also noted that the question of geopolitics always emerged in security efforts along the borders, especially with regard to the movement of contraband goods and illicit businesses. Despite the noted challenges, cross-border cooperation was critical as this would ensure that terrorism is dealt with in a better manner. Cross-border cooperation had also led to good working relationships between the border communities and government institutions in general. A common working strategy for all the agencies provided a forum for sharing of sensitive security related information that led to timely dismantling of illicit transactions taking place between the Kenya-Somalia borders. It further emerged that cross-border cooperation had significantly reduced terrorist activities as local communities and people living along the borders cooperate in a coordinated manner to avail crucial information to security agencies so that they can proactively act on potential terror groups and criminals in the region.

This study's findings were a reflection of sentiments by other previous studies. For instance, Otsialo and Hajir (2014) acknowledged that cross-border cooperation would be

highly desirable if terror activities are to be effectively dealt with. However, this does not always happen as communities here are sometimes further polarized based on political completion or other sectarian interests. Such scenarios for instance that led to the establishment of a powerful twenty-one-man Garre Council of Elders in 2012, which drew membership from all the clans in Mandera.

Criminals' Easy Access to Weapons and Counter-terrorism at Liboi Border

The study also focused on the influence of easy access to security weapons by criminals on counter- terrorism at Liboi border. A number of propositions were used to explore this variable where the respondents were asked questions based on a 5-point Likert scale. These responses are summarized in Table7.

Table 7. Criminals' Easy Access to Weapons and Counterterrorism

Statements	1=strongly disagree	2= disagree	3= neutral	4= Agree	5=Strongly Agree	Total
	n(%)	n(%)	n(%)	n(%)	n(%)	n(%)
There is an increase of small arms and light weapons in Liboi borders	2 (4)	12 (23)	14 (27)	18 (35)	6 (12)	52 (100)
Proliferation of small arms and light weapons often lead to escalation of terrorist activities in Liboi border areas	5 (10)	7 (13)	10 (19)	16 (31)	14 (27)	52 (100)
There are often concerted efforts from all the affected countries to address the problem of small arms and light weapons in this area	12 (23)	13 (25)	10 (19)	9 (17)	8 (15)	52 (100)
There are effective structures to address the problem of small arms and light weapons in this area	11 (21)	16 (31)	15 (29)	6 (12)	4 (8)	52 (100)
Small arms and light weapons are not in any way associated with terrorist activities in Liboi border areas	19 (37)	14 (27)	9 (17)	6 (12)	4 (8)	52 (100)

As reflected on Table 7, there were mixed reactions regarding whether there is an increase of small arms and light weapons in Liboi borders, where 24 (47%) of the respondents agreed with this account whereas 16 (27%) of them disagreed and 14 (27%) neither agree nor disagree. It also emerged that proliferation of small arms and light weapons often lead to escalation of terrorist activities in Liboi border areas, with the respondents expressing varying levels of approval or disapproval of this view. Of those interviewed, 30 (58%) of them agreed with this account, 12 (23%) disagreed while 10 (19%) had neutral views. Similarly, there were

divided opinions regarding whether there are often concerted efforts from all the affected countries to address the problem of small arms and light weapons in Liboi area, where 25 (48%) of the respondents disagreed, 17 (32%) concurred while 10 (19%) indicated that they were not sure.

The findings also revealed that they are effective structures to address the problem of small arms and light weapons in the Liboi area. However, some of the respondents expressed reservations, where 27 (52%) of them felt that the structures might not be as effective. Furthermore, 15 (29%) of those who were interviewed neither agreed or disagreed that there were effective structures for addressing the problem of small arms and light weapons. Only 10 (20%) of the respondents agreed with the fact that the structures were effective for dealing with proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the Liboi area. Majority of the respondents refuted the claim that small arms and light weapons are not in any way associated with terrorist activities in Liboi border areas, with 33 (64%) of them holding this stand against 10 (20%) who thought otherwise. Only 9 (17%) of the respondents indicated that they had neutral views regarding the effectiveness of the structures for addressing small arms and light weapons in the Liboi area. Overall, it was evident that easy access to small arms and weapons by criminals had serious negative impacts on counterterrorism efforts in the Liboi area.

Regarding general views about the influence of proliferation of small arms and light weapons on counterterrorism in Liboi border areas, the study revealed that this caused heightened spread of terror activities in the region. Although not as rampant as it used to be in the past, terrorists still had the leeway to easily acquire small arms and light weapons from across the Somalia border which they smuggled and used to plan attacks along various routes in Liboi area. These also included improvised explosive devices which caused serious threats to the safety and security in the region. However, smuggling and proliferation of small arms and light weapons greatly contribute to the rampant cases of terrorism often witnessed in the area. It was also noted that in the recent past terrorists used small arms to carry out assassinations as they advanced their ideological wars. These attacks were also witnessed on KDF troops and other security agencies.

Due to increased cases of small arms in the hands of civilians in the area, security agencies were forced to change tack on how to handle this problem since even the local community members sometimes end up arming themselves in order to keep off criminals. In this sense, it becomes a challenge for the security agencies to differentiate between an al-Shabaab criminal and a harmless member of the local community. Generally, proliferation of small arms and light weapons continues to fuel spread of terror activities in Liboi area. This has further caused poor engagement between the local border communities and security agencies, especially when it comes to removing illegal firearms from the hands of the common civilians who are keen on keeping the guns for self-protection. However, proper coordination and close cooperation among different institutions working in the areas has led to active sharing of crucial information that has been used to address the whole problem of insecurity and terrorist threats in the region.

From the foregoing statistics, it is evident that the findings of the current study corroborated results of previous researches on this subject. Ombati (2016) noted that terrorism activities remain closely associated with easy access of small arms and light weapons by criminals. This scenario gave terrorist groups the advantage to easily achieve their objectives of spreading terror in their targeted countries or areas. At the same time, Okoth-Yogo (2012) noted that easy access to small arms and light weapons has enabled criminal gangs to terrorize and stage armed robberies along the borders, both within and across Kenyan borders. Mustafa and Vendley (2010) also revealed that weapons have also been used to facilitate drug trafficking, smuggling of gold and other mineral substances, hence generally causing a high sense of fear among the border communities. Similar sentiments were expressed by Kimanthi

(2016) by postulating that porous borders have also contributed to influx of refugees into the country, who eventually pose serious security threats such as those related to violent extremism.

Inferential Statistical Analysis of Variables

Influence of Government Security Agencies on Counter-terrorism

Based on the bivariate regression analysis in Table 8, with all factors held into account and at zero, the constant was 2.512; which meant that at ceteris paribus, the level of counterterrorism activities at Liboi border area would be at 2.512. However, a unit increase in government security agencies, considering other factors constant, would lead to 0.14 positive changes in counterterrorism activities. Additionally, at 5% level of significance, it implies that at $P=0.001 < 0.05$, government security agencies positively influenced counterterrorism activities at the Liboi border area.

Table 8. Regression Coefficients for Government Security Agencies

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	2.512	.501		5.011	.000
	Government security agencies	.14	.037	.301	3.780	.001

The model summary in Table 9 demonstrates the coefficient of determination as indicated by Adjusted R squared to be 0.473 implying that 47.3% of counterterrorism activities was explained by effectiveness of government security agencies.

Table 9. Model summary for effectiveness of government security agencies

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.768	.590	.473	1.20456

In Table 10, the ANOVA was used to show the overall model significance. Since the p-value is less than 0.05, then effectiveness of government security agencies had a significant explanatory power on counterterrorism activities. ($F=33.35$ and $p\text{-value} < 0.05$).

Table 10. ANOVA for effectiveness of security agencies and counterterrorism activities

Model		Sum of Squares	Df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	37.693	1	37.69	33.35	.000
	Residual	56.519	50	1.13		
	Total	94.212	51			

Regression Analysis of the Influence of Interagency Coordination on Control of Terrorism Activities

The bivariate regression analysis in Table 11 shows that the constant for interagency coordination was 1.074. However, a unit increase in interagency coordination, all other factors held constant, would lead to 0.711 increases in counterterrorism activities. Additionally, at 5%

level of significance, it implies that at $P=000<0.05$, interagency coordination had a strong positive influence on counterterrorism activities at the Liboi border area.

Table 11. Regression Coefficients for Interagency Coordination

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	1.074	.421		2.602	.007
	Interagency coordination	.711	.117	.527	6.068	.000

The model summary in Table 12, demonstrates the coefficient of determination as indicated by Adjusted R-squared to be 0.387 implying that 38.7% of counterterrorism activities is explained by security inter-agency coordination.

Table 12. Model summary for effectiveness of security inter-agency coordination and counterterrorism activities

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.635	.403	.387	.6784

In Table 13, the ANOVA was used to show the overall model significance. Since the p-value is less than 0.05, then security inter-agency coordination had a significant explanatory power on counterterrorism activities. ($F=18.67$ and $p\text{-value}<0.05$).

Table 13. ANOVA for Interagency Coordination

Model		Sum of Squares	Df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	25.615	1	25.62	18.67	.000 ^b
	Residual	68.597	50	1.37		
	Total	94.212	51			

Regression Analysis of the Influence of Cross-border Cooperation on Counterterrorism

The bivariate regression analysis in Table 14 indicates that the constant for interagency coordination was 1.372. However, a unit increase in cross-border cooperation, all other factors held constant, would lead to 0.727 increases in counterterrorism activities. Additionally, at 5% level of significance, it implies that at $P=003<0.05$, cross-border cooperation had a strong positive influence on counterterrorism activities at the Liboi border area.

Table 14. Regression Coefficients for Cross-border Cooperation

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	1.372	.431		2.501	.000
	Cross-border Cooperation	.727	.106	.523	6.8579	.003

The model summary in Table 15 demonstrates the coefficient of determination as indicated by Adjusted R squared to be 0.312 implying that 31.2% of counterterrorism activities is explained by cross border cooperation.

Table 15. Model summary for cross border cooperation and counterterrorism activities

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.572	.327	.312	.8357

In Table 16, the ANOVA was used to show the overall model significance. Since the p-value is less than 0.05, then cross border cooperation had a significant explanatory power on counterterrorism activities (F=23.28 and p-value <0.05).

Table 16. ANOVA for Cross-border Cooperation

Model		Sum of Squares	Df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	29.931	1	29.93	23.28	.000 ^b
	Residual	64.281	50	1.29		
	Total	94.212	51			

Regression Analysis of Influence of Criminals' Access to Security Weapons on Counterterrorism

The bivariate regression analysis in Table 17 shows that the constant for interagency coordination was 1.619. However, a unit increase in criminals' access to security weapons, all other factors held constant, would impact counterterrorism activities by 0.733. Furthermore, at 5% level of significance, it means that at $P=0.001 < 0.05$, criminals' access to security weapons strongly influenced counterterrorism activities at the Liboi border area.

Table 17. Regression Coefficients for Criminals' Access to Security Weapons

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	1.619	.324		7.421	.000
	Criminal access to security weapons	.733	.109	.529	6.7243	.001

The model summary in Table 18 demonstrates the coefficient of determination as indicated by Adjusted R squared to be 0.378, implying that 37.8% of counterterrorism activities was explained by cross border cooperation.

Table 18 Model summary for access to weapons by criminals and counterterrorism activities

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.632	.399	.378	.7543

In Table 19, the ANOVA was used to show the overall model significance. Since the p-value is less than 0.05, then access to weapons by criminals had a significant explanatory power on counterterrorism activities. ($F=27.39$ and $p\text{-value} < 0.05$).

Table 19. ANOVA for Criminals' Access to Security Weapons

Model		Sum of Squares	Df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	33.343	1	33.34	27.39	.000
	Residual	60.869	50	1.22		
	Total	94.212	51			

Multiple Linear Regression

Multiple linear regression model was adopted for testing the significance of the influence of the independent variables on the dependent variable. Therefore, the overall model for the study was:

$$Y = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_1 + \beta_2 X_2 + \beta_3 X_3 + \beta_4 X_4 + \varepsilon$$

Where Y = counterterrorism activities, the dependent variable and X 's are the independent variables where X_1 = effectiveness of government security agency, X_2 = security inter-agency coordination, X_3 = cross border cooperation, X_4 = access to weapons by criminal and ε is the error term. β s are the coefficients of the model.

Summary, Conclusions and Recommendations

Summary

Government Security Agencies and Counter-terrorism

Objective 1 of the study was to understand the influence of government security agencies on counterterrorism at the Liboi border area. It emerged that although there is often a good working relationship among all security agencies, a lot still remains to be done to enhance structures for further collaborations. It was also established that there was multi agency cooperation in the border area which had yielded notable positive results on counterterrorism. Similarly, the government was fully involved in ensuring that there is multi-agency collaboration in counterterrorism efforts in the Liboi border area. Based on inferential statistics, the coefficient correlation R was 0.916; which implied that government security agencies have a strong influence on counterterrorism activities in the Liboi area. Furthermore, the coefficient of determination R Square (R^2) is 0.819; meaning that 81.9% of counterterrorism activities in Liboi border areas were explained by the activities of government security agencies.

Interagency Coordination and Counter-terrorism

Objective 2 of the study entailed investigating the influence of security inter-agency coordination on control of terrorism activities along Liboi border. The study noted that there is often inter-agency coordination to enhance counterterrorism efforts in the Liboi area, but this was not as effective as it would have been expected. Furthermore, the government was also actively involved in interagency coordination but there were no proactive measures for ensuring that the right momentum was always maintained. Inferential statistics indicated that coefficient correlation R was 0.817; which meant that interagency coordination has a strong influence on counterterrorism activities in the Liboi area. Furthermore, the coefficient of determination R Square (R^2) was 0.727; meaning that 72.7% of counterterrorism activities in Liboi border areas was explained by interagency coordination.

Cross-Border Cooperation and Counter-terrorism

Objective 3 of the study was to analyze the effect of cross-border cooperation on counter-terrorism at Liboi border. The study noted that there was generally cross-border cooperation to enhance counterterrorism efforts in the Liboi area. However, there were cases where there was no clear goodwill from either of the two countries. It also emerged that countries sharing the common borders were trying their best to ensure that there was effective and continuous interstate collaboration in order to identify criminals in the area for the sake of decisively rooting out terrorism in Liboi border areas. Inferential analysis indicated that the coefficient correlation R was 0.798; which meant that cross-border cooperation has a strong influence on counterterrorism activities in the Liboi area. Furthermore, the coefficient of determination R^2 was 0.743; meaning that 74.3% of counterterrorism activities in Liboi border areas was explained by cross-border cooperation.

Criminals' Easy Access to Weapons and Counter-terrorism

Objective 4 of the study was to understand the influence of easy access to security weapons by criminals on counter-terrorism at Liboi border. It was noted that although due to multi pronged approaches to security and counterterrorism at Liboi border area there were not as many small arms in the hands of criminals, it was still evident that illegal ownership of small guns and light weapons was common among the communities living along the Kenya-Somalia common borders. Proliferation of small arms and light weapons in border areas often led to escalation of terrorist activities in Liboi border. Based on the inferential statistics, the coefficient correlation R was 0.799; implying that criminals' access to security weapons has a strong influence on counterterrorism activities in the Liboi area. Furthermore, the coefficient of determination R^2 was 0.631; meaning that 63.1% of counterterrorism activities in Liboi border areas is explained by criminals' access to security weapons.

Conclusions

There were various general implications of security, border control and counter-terrorism along Liboi border of Mandera, with the overall indication that terror activities have significantly been reduced in the area. Relative calm had returned in the Liboi border area as a result of aggressive security operations by Kenya's security agencies, as opposed to Somalia's contribution which was generally limited. However, the fight against terrorism in Liboi border areas still remained a big challenge, especially due to the ever-emerging al-Shabaab sympathizers, unfavorable political dynamics, contraband business dealings, and illegal firearms among other factors. But, increasing cooperation among various agencies was giving hope.

Recommendations

The study recommended that border control and security agencies should use a holistic approach to address insecurity along border areas. The border control agencies should address counterterrorism resolutely by involving all stakeholders. The government should also proactively work hand in hand with local NGOs and CBOs for effective sharing of crucial information to help in making critical decisions regarding security and terror activities in the border regions.

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Appendix I: Map of Mandera County

