

---

**Democracy, Political Parties and Corruption in Indonesia**

---

Dr. Endang Turmudi, M.A.  
Research Centre for Society and Culture  
National Research and Innovation Agency (BRIN),  
Jl. Gatot Subroto 10, Widia Graha, Jakarta, Indonesia

**Abstract.** Scholars are in tune with each other about the important role of political parties in promoting and strengthening democracy and bridging the aspirations of the people with those who hold the power. Since the fall of Suharto and its subsequent political reforms, the number of political parties in Indonesia has grown large and there have been five national elections. However, despite being great in number, Indonesian political parties have not yet been institutionalised to maximum effect. To the extent that democracy has been developed, it has not been based on pure popular sovereignty but rather it has become what Aspinal and Berenschot (2019) refer to as a patronage democracy. Politicians have been prone to acts of corruption, which accounts for 61 percent of the corruption that occurs in Indonesia. With the implementation of competition between parties through elections having been accomplished, it would seem the requirements for democracy are in place. Yet the incidence of corruption signals something wrong in Indonesian politics in general and political parties in particular. This article examines both the national and regional elections in which Indonesian political parties vie for power. It will also attempt to understand why and how politicians continue to commit corrupt acts undeterred by the imprisonment of many such perpetrators.

**Keywords:** Corruption, Democratisation, Election, Political Party, Regional Election

### **Introduction**

With the presence of many political parties after the fall of Suharto in 1998, the creation of a strong democracy in Indonesia seemed promising because political parties, as stated by political scientists, are important institutions of democracy (Fionna, 2013: 167). By the 1999 elections, there were 180 different political parties, 48 of which participated that year. Many hoped that democracy in Indonesia could be built through healthy competition between the various existing parties. Party competition in general elections, as a characteristic of democracy (see Schleiter and Voznaya, 2016), continues to take place every five years. Thus it is assumed that both the institutionalisation of the party system and the introduction of democracy itself have touched the people at a grassroots level. It is hoped that this political phenomenon is a significant step towards democracy following the 32-year authoritarian regime that governed the Indonesian people previously.

However, the facts on the ground show that this developing democracy contains elements of decay. Its pattern of elections, for example, has been embellished by ‘money politics’, showing a lack of strength of political parties. So, this democratic situation, on the other hand, has resulted in the spread of corruption in various regions, to the point that politicians have been labelled as the most corrupt people in the country. Strangely, this corruption has never been reduced even though various measures have been implemented to stop it. Although corrupters have been imprisoned, other corrupters always appear. What is interesting is that in the middle of the COVID-19 pandemic, when the Indonesian people are suffering economically, there are ministers who have committed corruption by stealing state money to distribute to the poor. In November 2020, two ministers were caught by the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), one of which was the Minister of Social Affairs, who stole money from the main food budgets to be distributed to the poor. This is only one of

hundreds of arrests of corrupt politicians, including those who held regional offices, such as regents and governors.

Various studies have shown democratic patterns and practices in Indonesia that turn out to no longer rely on the power of the people (see Aspinal and Berenschot, 2019; cf. Mietzner, 2015). The election, as a characteristic of democracy, is no longer a media where people are free to express their voices, according to rational and conscious consideration. However, people's voices are bought by party candidates who are nominated as members of parliament or regional heads. The literature explains that politics in Indonesia is characterised by the weakness of the institutionalisation of parties and the party system (see Fionna, 2013). This condition causes the values and objectives of the party to not be properly understood by party cadres and its constituents. Another important point related to the weakness of political parties is their inadequate budgets, meaning they cannot help promote their cadres to enter political positions. In this case, the cadres finance themselves in the competition to become parliament members or heads of regions through elections. This political process is quite expensive because the cadres must provide political money to the voters. The logical action after they are elected is that they must be able to restore the capital used for the election. This is what then causes corruption by the cadres, using their position as members of parliament and regional heads. This is the tendency at the local level. My question is about the national level and the extent of the involvement of party leaders in that political process.

This paper analyses the weakness of political parties in Indonesia, particularly how they involve their cadres in political competitions both in participating in *pemilu* (general elections) and in occupying political positions, such as governors, to become heads of regions. This paper will explore the relationship between the weak political parties and the corrupt behaviour of their cadres who have become politicians in parliament and regional heads'. It analyses the significance of democratisation that carries political progress, considering that democracy provides people with the freedom to actively participate in politics, such as through voting in elections or even competing to occupy important positions in their regions. Even so, the development of democratisation, which revived local politics, has led to the emergence of corrupt behaviour carried out by party cadres who are politicians. One thing that is clear is that the institutionalisation of political parties is not what leads to democracy.

This study analyses data generated online and offline, which came from field research I did some years ago and later became a perspective in understanding political corruption events. This study does have limitations because the politics and political parties studied continue to grow and corruption behaviour also continues to emerge. In addition, changes made by various parties continue to occur with the intention of strengthening political parties as an important element of democracy. Nonetheless, it is clear that there is a pattern that highlights the high cost of political contestation and the impact of political party weakness on political corruption. The results of this analysis contribute to current literature on the relationship between political parties that continue to weaken and their corrupt cadres. Democracy that provides transparency and where accountability is demanded does not prevent politicians from committing corruption. This corruption arises because the costs that politicians must bear to become members of parliament or regional heads are quite large. What is important is that this study shows the corruption of party members at the central level in local politics in several regions, for example by asking for political dowry from cadres involved in *pilkada* (regional head elections) or through bribes for government projects under the coordination of their party.

### **Significant Changes: Pemilu and Pilkada**

The most obvious change in the political system in Indonesia immediately post-Suharto, i.e. after political reforms was conducted, was the birth of many political parties. This change was marked, for example, by the establishment of around 180 political parties by people with various ideological background although only 48 parties met the administrative requirements and were allowed to take part in the 1999 elections. This development of parties was indeed part of the democratic euphoria that came over a people newly freed from authoritarian rule under the New Order regime in which political parties became incompetent and dysfunctional (Fionna, 2013: 14). The parties participating in the 1999 elections, for example, ranged from secular to Islamic based. The presence of these Islamic parties is important not only in its reflection of an atmosphere of liberal democracy marked by contestation between adherents of political Islam and secular nationalists, but also to measure the pulse of Indonesian politics itself (see Bouchier, 2019).

If democracy relies on the strengthening of parties as one of its foundations, then the institutionalisation of the party system that occurred after the introduction of post-Suharto political reforms marked Indonesia as a country returning to democracy in its politics. Scholars share the same view about the importance of political parties in building and sustaining democracy (Fionna, 2013: 17) because political parties' function is to serve the interests of the people who support them. How political parties strengthen their role can be seen in the way they form a party leadership structure. The more they connect with their constituents and encourage their participation at the grassroots level, the larger role they can play. Ufen (2008) observed that several parties were established after Suharto's New Order (e.g. Golkar, PDIP and PPP), and those as well as some having a religious support base (e.g. the NU-based PKB) have been easily institutionalised and have prioritised ideology as their missions.

The institutionalisation of the party system in supporting democracy, according to Schleiter and Voznaya (2016: 4), is marked by two factors: 'the regularity of competition and the organisational stability of parties within the system'. With both general and regional elections held every five years, the competition aspect of strengthening democracy is fulfilled because, as agreed by Wellhofer and Hennesey, 'the fundamental feature of democracy is to be a system of institutionalised opposition' (1974: 135). However, democracy requires other conditions that are no less important, such as the strength of the existing political parties (Fionna, 2013). The strength of the party itself is measured by various conditional aspects such as regeneration, member recruitment, and the party's own financial problems. So as many scholars agree, the problem of party institutionalisation is an important factor for the consolidation of democracy (Basedau & Stroh, 2008). Even in countries where voters are mature and active in their political culture, strong institutionalisation, as demonstrated by Schleiter and Voznaya (2016), can play a role in 'conditioning the effectiveness of elections as tools for voters to control politicians and to secure clean government'.

Another thing to note is the change in 2009 to an open proportional pemilu system. In the previous two pemilu under 'political reforms', a closed proportional, ranked voting system of nominations to the national legislature was used with only party members determining the outcomes. When existing legislative candidates proposed changes, the Constitutional Court issued a judicial review emphasising that the candidates who are entitled to seats in parliament (DPR) are those who receive the most votes – those who fulfil voter divisor index (Surbakti, 2015: vii). With this decision, political parties no longer have power over who represents their interests in parliament through the election of the candidates they propose. Now the pemilu system elects candidates, not parties. This system requires individual candidates to really raise themselves to be the best candidates that can be chosen

by the community. This makes for a highly competitive race because candidates must run for office against not only candidates from other parties but from their own.

Another notable change has been to the leadership structure of political parties such that the grassroots movements are revived. Fionna (201), who studied four political parties in Malang, shows how political parties recruit their new cadres. Although they may differ in manner or style, political parties typically use their cadres to revive local politics as a means to encourage participation. This change is clearly visible in their efforts to maintain the support of the voters in anticipation of general elections. The Golkar Party, which during Suharto's reign was easily able to find cadres and a base of voter support in general elections, must now compete with other parties because the Suharto-era network no longer exists in the same form.

The 2009 election was the first election in which a competition between candidates of the same party occurred, resulting in an extremely expensive campaign. Each candidate for parliament was forced to amass huge political war chests to give money and gifts to win voters. This was required of incumbent candidates as well as their challengers. As a result, all legislative candidates had to convince voters that they were the party cadres who would fight for the political interests of their constituents. With such a field, the competition between legislative candidates is heavy, with each candidate having to choose the right fighting strategy as well as to use whatever means necessary to qualify as a member of the legislature. Nevertheless, as will be seen in the discussion here, the role of the party remains large at the national, provincial and district levels in the pemilu.

The pilkada or regional election system has also changed significantly since 2005, as governors, regents and mayors have been elected directly by the people in their regions. They had been elected by district or province Regional People's Representative Councils until the enactment of Law No. 32 of 2004 (Simkada, 2020). This is, of course, a big democratic festival because in this event the people participate in local politics. Some of the thoughts underlying the direct pilkada were to break the oligarchy of party leaders\* who, by coordinating with members of the local parliament, were able to assist their desired candidate for regent or governor in winning the election. Second, direct elections were expected to increase political participation in their regions. In addition, the people could also be proposed as candidates for regional leadership positions, something not possible during the Suharto era when governors and regents were appointed by Suharto and elected by the local parliament assembly. And no less important was the hope that direct voting by the people would eliminate or decrease the influence of money on politics, often seen when local legislators elected regional heads (Yuniarto, 2020).

Just like the pemilu, the pilkada also allows for various candidates to run for 'number one' in their regions. Like pemilu, nominations for regional heads are submitted by political parties. Parties with at least 20 percent of the seats in local parliament may nominate candidates for regent, mayor or governors. The basis for this provision is Article 40 paragraph (1) of Law No. 10 of 2016 concerning the Election of Governors, Regents and Mayors (Mardhatillah, 2019). Parties with less than 20 percent of the seats may form coalitions with larger or smaller parties to fulfil the requirements and thus are able to nominate their own candidates. However, candidates for regional leadership roles may also be individuals who meet certain conditions, such as having a certain number of supporters from the community. In 2020, there were 67 independent pairs of running mates (governor and deputy governor) out of 734 who took part in the simultaneous local elections.

---

\* The party or party leadership still has a key role, considering that the initial nomination of candidates for the *pilkada* must be by political parties. To be nominated, the candidate must buy a ticket to the party. The case for the nomination of the regent of Central Lampung is showing this political practice. Because this is included in the category of corruption, the Lampung case is currently being investigated by the Corruption Eradication Commission.



### Democracy and Political Corruption

Developing countries where democracy is in its infancy do not hold a monopoly on corruption; it also occurs in developed countries (Newell and Bull, 2003). What distinguishes it is the situation alone, which ranges from merely bad to extremely bad. To see how high corruption is in Indonesia, we can look at the corruption index published by Transparency International Indonesia. According to Suyatmiko (2020), 'Indonesia's CPI in 2020 is at a score of 37/100 and is ranked 102 out of 180 countries surveyed. This score is down 3 points from last year's 2019 which was at a score of 40/100'. This places Indonesia at a lower ranking than other Asian countries such as India, Singapore and Malaysia, and is an indication of the magnitude of corruption in Indonesia. What is interesting is that the largest amount of corruption is committed by politicians (cf. Adam, 2008).

Before further discussing political corruption in Indonesia, it is helpful to define it. This is important to understand because scholars often disagree on it. Members of the political community itself, including those in the Western world, often have different understandings of its meaning. What is meant by corruption in the UK is different from that of other democratic countries (Newell & Bull, 2003: 2) because it is understood differently by diverse cultures with diverse norms, values and views. But scholars usually define *corruption* as an act that violates the public interest (cf. Alatas, 1975). The anti-corruption laws of Indonesia include bribery and gratification, or the enriching of oneself or others. As will be seen, acts of corruption committed by politicians revolve around bribes or mark-ups of budgets through government projects and the budget agency of parliament.

The assumption that democratisation would create transparency, accountability and a strong mechanism for oversight by the people (thereby reducing corruption), has not entirely come true (Snape, 1999: 591). In fact, it has become more widespread among state officials and politicians even as democratisation has moved forward. Several prominent figures and politicians from President Yudhoyono's Democratic party, most notably party treasurer, Nazaruddin (KPK, 2017), were involved in massive corruption schemes. Nazaruddin's acts of corruption were especially horrendous because he was one of President Yudhoyono's high-level officials at that time. But Nazaruddin was just one of the Democrat party politicians who were entangled in corruption. Another Democratic member of parliament, Angelina Sondah, was also imprisoned, as was Yudhoyono's Minister of Youth and Sports, Andi Malarangeng. Even the general chairman of the party, Anas Urbaningrum, was committed to corruption during the same period.

Another mega-corruption was committed in 2017 by Chairman Setya Novanto of the Indonesian House of Representatives. His acts of corruption cost the state IDR2.7 trillion from the total project of IDR5.84 trillion. At that time, Novanto was the general chairman of the Golkar Party. In the same year Irman Gusman, the chairman of the Regional Representative Council was also arrested in a case of imported sugar quotas at the Logistics Affairs Agency. Many other parties have also been involved in corruption. The chairman of the United Development Party (PPP), Suryadarma Ali (KPK, 2017), who was Minister of Religious Affairs during the Yudhoyono administration, was also sent to jail for corruption. Lutfi Hassan, the President of the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), which was previously considered a clean party, also committed crimes of corruption, so that he was detained by the KPK (Corruption Eradication Commission) and sent to jail. So it seems that corruption by politicians, members of the national, district, and provincial legislatures is a common occurrence. In 2018, 41 of the 45 members of the Malang legislature were arrested for corruption; this represented an astounding 90 percent of the city's legislative members (Tempo.Co, 2010). Indonesian Corruption Watch reports there were 885 members of the parliament entangled in corruption from 2003 to 2018. Until 2020, the KPK recorded 300 regional heads as corruption suspect including 27 governors. I only highlight the problem of

corruption among regional and local politicians because it is exactly the thing that was supposed to be prevented by the openness that accompanies democratisation politics.

Another case of corruption needed to highlight happened in November and December 2020. Two government ministers were arrested in a corruption case that shocked the nation because it was exposed during the COVID-19 pandemic when much of the public was experiencing financial difficulty. The Minister of Social Affairs, a member of the ruling PDI-P party, was caught skimming money which was intended for distribution by his ministry to the poor. He disgustingly took IDR10,000 (IDR33,000 according to an NGO's calculations) from each 300,000-rupiah food package to be distributed. Thus, this minister stole tens of billions of rupiahs, not to mention that he also received gifts from the company contracted to distribute the packages. Another corruption case ensnared the Minister of Maritime and Fisheries and member of the Gerindra party, who was arrested by the KPK at Soekarno-Hatta airport upon his return from Hawaii in November 2020. He was arrested for corruption related to the government's lobster export trade. Specifically, he accepted a monetary reward from the company he awarded rights to export lobster.

On 27 February 2021, a governor of South Sulawesi, who was supported by PDI-P during the election, was also arrested by the KPK on corruption charges. A former governor of South Sumatra was also detained by the KPK on 16 September 2021, including his son, Dodi Reza, a regent of Musi Banyuasin who was caught red-handed by the KPK on 15 October 2021. Although their crimes were slightly different, the four of them were all charged under the anti-corruption law. What is interesting to see in the case of the Minister of Social Affairs is the alleged involvement of the political party. Batubara is the treasurer of the PDI-P, and two DPR members were also involved (Aji, 2021). He is suspected of having committed crimes of great proportion as he was collecting money for his party. Many find this unsurprising as Batubara is a businessman whose corruption was not solely in his own interest. Prominent politicians and small political parties alike have been charged with various acts of corruption.

### **The Weakness of Political Party**

In fact, it has become an open secret that the parties demand that cadres and regional leaders, once elected to the legislative or executive branch, contribute funds to the party. This can be seen in the case of Musa Zaenuddin, a member of the DPR from the PKB who was convicted in court on corruption charges. Zaenuddin, a member of the Commission V of the DPR, received a bribe of IDR7 billion from a businessman in return for a road construction project contract awarded by the committee. He himself took one billion while the rest was handed over to party leadership of his party, through the head of his faction in the DPR. In a recent development regarding the corruption caused within the legislature, I was informed by a member of the DPR<sup>†</sup> that he was asked for 'dowry' by his party head when he was nominated to take part in the 2019 pemilu. The chairman of his party offered him a spot at the top of the list of candidates in return for a donation of DR500 million to the party. This request took place prior to the election; and he was only placed at the top of the list of candidates from his own party, although the current electoral system is proportionally open.

Thus the party, through its cadres in the DPR, was attempting to bid for various government projects. And they had a further advantage with party members serving on the DPR budgeting committee and in charge of funding these ministry projects. Those politicians who sit on this body were well positioned to negotiate with the ministry and urge the approval of budget plans proposed by the ministry. Furthermore, they were able to direct projects to those bidders who were well connected to the party. Two such Democrat members

<sup>†</sup> Personal communication (November 2020).

of the DPR budgeting agency, Nazaruddin and Angelina Sondah, were imprisoned for corruption. As a result of these events and to prevent further corrupt actions, this budget agency no longer has the authority to discuss technical budgeting issues for projects proposed by ministries.

The need to provide assistance to parties – because parties do not have much money – is often the excuse given by party leaders to pressure legislative candidates, regional candidates and elected legislators. There tends to be a tacit agreement between the party and party cadres who are legislators that they will fill the party treasury. And of course there are always party leaders with personal motives to enrich themselves, as evidenced by the imprisonment of PPP (Suryadarma Ali), Justice and Prosperous Party, PKS (Lutfi Hassan Ishaq) and Golkar (Setya Novanto and its secretary general, Idrus Marham).<sup>‡</sup> Thus it seems clear that the party struggles to fund cadre training and even to support its own existence. Because political parties are private rather than public institutions, their existence depends on how their leaders obtain and manage funds for their survival (cf. Bull and Newell, 2003).<sup>§</sup> Thus far there has been only small amounts of government assistance for the political parties – IDR1000 per general election vote received. The lack of party funds requires cadres who have important positions in the government to provide financial assistance. In addition, it encourages the formation of coalitions with the ruling party. At least by joining the cabinet the party has financial resources that are managed from its ministry projects. That is why, in the current Indonesian political scene, there are only two parties that can be called the opposition. The rest are close and form a coalition with the ruling party.

It is important to note that amid the institutionalisation of the party, the cadres themselves easily switch to other parties, a symptom of their lack of strong attachment to their party. This is a new phenomenon as there seems to be little difference in ideology between the parties (c.f. Turmudi, 2004). This might occur when the values instilled by the party are not deeply rooted in the political mentality of the party switcher, and the party's mission was not well understood. In the New Order era, as a comparison, the differences between Islamic and secular parties, for example, were stark; changing one's party membership was rare. A case study showed that a politician and cleric from an Islamic party who switched parties in support of Golkar, the government party, was then abandoned by his followers and students at his campus left to find other campuses. Switching parties from an Islamic party to a government party (not vice versa) is considered treason (c.f. Turmudi, 1998).

### High Political Costs

It is concerning that amid democratisation efforts, the hopes of the people for improved lives through better government are dashed by corrupt politicians. Members of parliament receive generous salaries as it is. In addition to a basic salary, members of the DPR receive various allowances, totalling a take-home pay of more than IDR50 million per month (Idris, 2020). But regardless of their income, members of the DPR and other politicians must raise large amounts of money to run for re-election to the DPR during general elections. Politician Pramono Anung, in a dissertation entitled 'Expensive Democracy, Fades of Ideology', estimates that political party activists must raise between IDR500 million and IDR2 billion to

---

<sup>‡</sup> The general chairman of PKB is also indicated to be corrupt, with the discovery of prize money of 300 million and the tweet of Musa Zaenuddin claiming to give 6 billion of the money he received from a bribe from a company working on a project under the coordination of the PKB faction. But the chairman of this party has not been arrested by the KPK, even after it emerged that he might receive a large political dowry in the case of the Central Lampung regent election.

<sup>§</sup> Certain parties were founded by people with their own capital, but many have been founded by ordinary political people who do not have vast amounts of capital. Therefore, several parties have recruited business people into their management. PKB, for example, recruited a Lion Air executive, and Golkar has long made Jusuf Kalla, an entrepreneur, its chairman (cf. Ufen, 2008).

participate in pemilu. Businesspeople running for the DPR usually raise around 6 billion (Wardana, 2020). And even raising these large amounts of money is no guarantee of success. A former ministry official became a candidate and was said to have spent as much as 25 billion in the 2019 election. However, he did not receive a significant portion of the vote and was not elected to the legislature.\*\*

The money raised generally goes to the operational costs of the success team (cf. Aspinal and Berenschot, 2019: 4) in their constituency, which usually covers four electoral districts. The money distributed by the success team varies from IDR20,000 to IDR200,000. In addition, the candidate must also pay a political 'dowry' to the party that nominates them (cf. Ufen, 2010). This is done for candidates who are not cadres but rather people from outside the party, such as celebrities. As with members of the legislature, local and regional candidates must also raise money to fund their campaigns. A good example of money politics was seen in the pilkada elections held in 270 regions on December 9, 2020. Sumiatin, a homemaker, was arrested by the anti-money politics task force of the Malang resort police. She was distributing 100 envelopes, each containing IDR20,000, in support of a main candidate for regional head of Malang (Ainun, 2020). This is just one case. The funds that must be raised for these campaigns can be much larger. According to an official at the Ministry of Home Affairs, the candidate for regent could spend IDR30 billion, whereas the gubernatorial candidate might spend up to IDR500 billion (Priyatin, 2018).

Ultimately, these costs must be repaid after the election because the money provided by the candidates is often loaned to them. The problem is that with such large campaign expenditures, the elected members' official salary is often not sufficient to repay these loans. That is why many members of the national or local DPR as well as regents and governors become involved in corruption schemes. Of the IDR30 billion that must be raised by the candidate for a regent election, for example, he could only raise IDR1 billion.†† The rest must be procured from sponsors. The regent's official salary is only around IDR6 million per month. It can be assumed that there are very few candidates for regional office who are not in debt since most of them do not use personal money when campaigning.

In addition to matters relating to the funds paid to supporters, legislative candidates in the regular process of nomination also receive funding from large entrepreneurs. In a local election case in one of the central cities in East Java in 2005, dozens of legislative candidates were funded as 'debt' by a businessman from Jakarta. Because they were funded by a businessman, the candidates had to pay or return the money by repaying services indirectly. These candidates paid the 'debt' off after they were elected as members of the local parliament. They paid it off together by approving a project plan submitted by the businessman. With secret collaboration between various parties, namely between the businessman and the local government, the regional budget (APBD) submitted by the government that designates funding for various regional development programs was easily approved by the legislative assembly. The members of the local parliament were concerned that some of the development programs funded by the APBD would be done by someone who had helped their costs in nominating as a local parliament member. In the case of aid for regional head candidates, the contributor will benefit by getting government projects after the candidate they supported wins the election. Also the limitations on the number of donations regulated by the law could be easily hit by entrepreneur as government partners, which are

\*\* Informal communication with a parliament member (November 2020).

†† I did meet one regent who was not only clean from corruption but also was able to develop his region well. In an FGD at the Indonesian Institute of Sciences, I joked with him, asking when he would go to jail. I said that so many district heads have been dragged to prison by the KPK. The regent replied with a smile, understanding my joke, telling me that the nomination for regent was expensive. The cost should be between 20 and 30 billion, he said. He asserted that he came from a wealthy family from which the funds for his candidacy flowed without leaving him indebted upon election. In this way, he can work to develop his regency, so that it will later become a developed district.



specialised in using APBD funds, who work on local or central government projects in the local area (Irawan et al., 2012).

The provision of political money involving candidates and voters, can also occur in the context of the relationship between candidates and election organisers. In some cases even incumbents use APBD funds for this purpose. So, among acts of corruption in the political process of regional elections is the use of APBD funds to bribe the election organisers or the agency that oversees the elections (cf. Alatas, 1975). It has become a general suspicion that these two institutions are commonly involved in helping candidates win when there is a dispute in elections for regional heads or positions in the legislature. In fact, the law institution that handles election disputes cannot escape accusations of corruption because of a case where one of its high officers was bribed by a disputing party. The chairman of the Constitutional Court who handled the regional election dispute in one of the districts in Banten was thrown in prison for accepting bribes. The bribers, including the governor of Banten, were also sentenced to prison.

In these cases, the pattern commonly used by those who want to win in *pilkada*, qualify as members of the legislature or win in political disputes, is bribery. Several cases have been proven about the occurrence of this unlawful act. And as discussed above, this bribery is part of the political price that must be borne by those who later become members of the legislature or regional heads. The consequence is that those who successfully qualify to become regional leaders or members of the legislature will commit corruption to make up for the political costs that have been incurred. Indeed, it appears that the path taken to succeed in becoming a regional head or a member of a local or national legislature is rather long and involves political costs ranging from having to pay the party chairman as a political dowry to having to pay the election organisers in order to get votes that outperform the opponent when a problem occurs.

### **Strengthening Political Parties**

The patronage pattern may develop and strengthen when the competition in the *pemilu* changes from choosing a party to choosing a competing legislative candidate (open proportional). In this case, legislative candidates become patrons for some of their constituents. The common pattern is that the candidate gives political money to their potential voters (Aspinal & Berenschot, 2019). However, this pattern of represents only a short-term mutual benefit between patrons and clients – for the duration of the campaign period – because once the candidates are elected, they forget about their voters. The promises made during the campaign are no longer remembered when the candidates occupy their legislative seats. However, some politicians are aware that such attitudes and actions can harm them when they run for re-election. For this reason, some politicians not only maintain the patronage pattern but also try to benefit their voters by creating development schemes in their home regions. This type of scheme is a way for a politician to build up their voting community, and is often referred to as ‘aspiration funds’, which is to say they are based on the people’s demands. The DPR has decided on such a plan, calling it the ‘Electoral District Development Program’ with a proposed budget of IDR11.2 trillion or IDR20 billion for each DPR member (Riewanto, 2015).

But despite its plausibility, the proposal for such a programme is surprising to many people. Apart from the fact that people do not trust DPR politicians as many of them are corrupt, there are also loopholes in the programme through which members of the legislature enrich themselves. Hence it is cynicism that has emerged as a common reaction. This programme is considered by some to be a trick by politicians to get money in the name of the people’s interests. Their suspicions proved true only two years after the ‘Aspiration Fund’ project started. A road construction project in the Maluku region with a budget of around

IDR100 trillion has been coloured by corrupt behaviour. The politicians who are on Commission V of the DPR, namely Damayanthi from PDI-P, Musa Zaenuddin from PKB and Budi from Golkar, have received gratuities,<sup>‡‡</sup> which landed them in prison for six to seven years. This corruption was motivated by both individual interests and party leaders.<sup>§§</sup>

This party's involvement can be seen in several cases, such as the corruption of the Minister of Social Affairs, and the ongoing case of the regent being supported by the PKB. This tendency towards political corruption is common in new democracies. Hardoon and Heinrich (2013: 3) reveal that corruption is run 'through the foundations of the democratic and legal process . . . ., affecting public trust in political parties, the judiciary and the police, among other key institutions'. These researchers conclude that 'around the world, political parties, the driving force of democracies, are perceived to be the most corrupt institution' (Hardoon & Heinrich, 2013). The case of which they speak is different from that in Indonesia where corruption is more clearly carried out by politicians, including party leaders, making the reputation of the party bad.

What is clear from this case of political corruption is that political parties in Indonesia are weak. The institutionalisation process they have undergone, including the recruitment of cadres, has not been optimal – at least not through acceptable standardisation. It is especially difficult for new parties to elect their cadres to the legislature, and old parties usually rely on their ideological issues. Big parties like PDI-P or Golkar clearly have ready cadres, considering that these parties have existed since Suharto came to power. Other medium-sized parties, such as PKB or PAN rely on ideological issues with which those who feel the same ideology wish to become their cadres. Other parties rely heavily on the charisma of their founders. The Democrat Party, for example, can recruit people to its cadres with the popularity of Yudhoyono alone, as he has been elected to two terms.

As for the weak institutionalisation of political parties, it is notable that all parties experience internal conflicts. In February 2021, the Indonesian people were given a spectacle of the internal conflict of the Democrat party, a party that shot up to greatness with its candidates rise to the presidency. The conflict to which Yudhoyono himself was exposed by the cadres he used to foster will likely cause the Democrat party to weaken and sink. At that time it was proven that a high-ranking government official, a former commander of the national army, was asked by those who opposed the Democrat party leadership to become the general chairman of this party by holding an extraordinary congressional session. This incident impressed upon the public that this party was being controlled by the government, and this was likely due to it being one of the two opposition parties. Although elected to the congress, the government did not admit it. Thus, the Democrat party survived and was led by the son of Yudhoyono.

The weakness of political parties has resulted in effectively no opposition as they do not dare to make corrections to the government or criticize corruption on the part of its officials (Mietzner, 2015). In the case of Indonesia, opposition to the regime is subdued because the parties that competed during the election had gathered in coalition with the ruling party. The Islamic parties, firmly rooted in ideological aspiration, could not run strong on their own (c.f. Turmudi, 2016). Therefore, they have not only been unable to nominate their own presidential candidate, but they dare not even be in opposition. They can only hope to maintain their existence and be represented in the presidential cabinet if they join and support a candidate proposed by a major party. This opposition is especially important in the context

---

<sup>‡‡</sup> The confession of another politician who was entangled in corruption, Damayanti from the ruling party, suggests that the leadership of Commission V of DPR asked at the beginning for a compensation fee of IDR 10 trillion, because the ministry entrusted with the project by members of the DPR received a budget of IDR 100 trillion.

<sup>§§</sup> I was told by a friend who was a ministry deputy. The deputy was offered a project fund of two billion by his minister who said that this fund could be used for a ministry project under the coordination of the deputy on condition that 10–15 percent be deducted for the benefit of his party.

of eradicating corruption because, as Tomsa (2015) said, in the context of local politics, ‘the outcomes of corruption investigations at the local level are chiefly determined by the dynamics of local power politics’.

From what has been discussed, it is clear that the weakness of political parties contributes to the emergence of corruption by politicians. With the weakness of party leadership, politicians move to find projects that benefit them. From here, there are indeed two problems that must be solved that are of concern to many people because both are detrimental to the state's finances, which means taking people's money. Since what is being discussed is political corruption, improvements must be directed at strengthening political parties and at the same time putting the brakes on or reducing incidents of corruption. Although related, it must be stated here that the two are not in a position where one results in the other. In this case, the weakness of political parties does not necessarily lead to the birth of corruption by politicians because acts of corruption by politicians can also occur in conditions where political parties are strong, considering that the cause of corruption is also not a single factor.

Strengthening political parties through their institutionalisation is not easy, at least if you look at the parties that were founded after the political reforms in 1998. This institutionalisation has not been successful. So far, parties, including the older ones, are still having problems with leadership. As stated above, almost all parties have been hit by a leadership crisis, as illustrated by the conflict between their leaders, which even resulted in the birth of two party leaderships. Only parties such as the PDI-P (Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle) that appear to be strong might have carried out meaningful institutionalisation. Even the parties that were co-founded by superior figures, such as Yudoyono in the Democrat Party, are not well institutionalised as indicated by a conflict and a crack in its leadership. The PDI-P's strength as the ruling party seems to be due to its top leadership being Megawati, the former President of Indonesia and the heir to the Indonesian National Party founded by Sukarno. Because Megawati is Sukarno's daughter, no one dares to criticise or change the leadership of this party even through congress. However, the leadership of the PDIP is oligarchic, which on the other hand will be a weakness of the party itself. In addition, it is clear that many PDIP politicians have committed acts of corruption, beyond the consolidation of this party.

The weakness of these parties is clear because their institutionalisation or the institutionalisation of the party system here has not been maximised or has not reached its target. Structurally it may be true that the party has reached the grassroots level and is led by good cadre, but other things have not been fulfilled. For example, the people's attachment to the party. It is true that they chose a party in the election, but the choice was baseless because there was no belief that this party was the best and fought for their interests. Their support for the party was given only because they were given political money, which means their support can change if more political money is given by different parties. However, it should be noted that such strong support, namely people's support for a party due to it being considered the best or because the party will fight for their rights, is rather difficult to find, considering that almost all parties do not bind its people with ideological emotions.

Proposals to strengthen political parties came from various circles, especially Indonesian political observers. Consolidated democracy requires solid and strong political parties with qualified cadres. Weaknesses experienced by political parties, such as the ineffectiveness of party institutionalisation or the party system, leads to the unavailability of an adequate budget. Contribution from party membership cannot ideally be expected because apart from the small number of party members the tradition of paying party fees is also not strong. Individual contributions that can be given to parties are also limited, namely only IDR1 billion from individuals and IDR7.5 billion from groups or business entities. These

shortcomings have made political parties weak, as evidenced by their inability to fund their cadres in the general election. On the contrary, they even ask for political dowries from cadres who run for elections. That is why strengthening political parties must be a concern because political parties are an important element in strengthening democracy. The government finally tried to help fund the existing parties by allocating IDR 6 trillion per year, which will start in 2023 (CNN Indonesia, 2019). This financial assistance is determined through a government decree. This will at least add to the assistance that is usually given by the government so far, which is very small. Assistance is formerly provided based on the number of votes in the election, with a rate of IDR1000 per vote. The addition of this assistance fund is intended to increase the regeneration of party cadres, and in general it is hoped to increase their energy to drive political parties.

In addition to strengthening political parties, the provision of larger aid funds is based on the idea that the state could take over the ownership of the party from the money owners and at the same time hand over its leadership to the democratic decisions of its cadres and members. So far, the party is identical to its founders and that is why its leadership feels oligarchic. The top party leaders deliberately show a fierce face so that no one dares to challenge them, and those who dare to run for office will be punished by being excluded from the party management or shifted to an unimportant position after the incumbent wins. The idea of breaking the thread of the oligarchy by providing adequate assistance from the state is indeed good, but there is an unintended consequence. That is, it is possible that with large funding assistance from the government that many new parties will be established even though these parties may not sell well in the election and disband after the election. However, the magnitude of assistance from the government as well as from the business side will be an attractive factor for opportunists who may attempt to form parties simply to be able to earn money with which they can live.

Apart from the inability of the party to supporting its own cadres for political positions, the leadership of the Nasdem Party has done something interesting. In the 2019 election, this party chose not to collect political dowries from its cadres who ran for legislative membership, but instead provided funds to assist its cadres in meeting their financial needs during their campaigns. Although this is not the first and only political party to provide such support to its cadres, in this instance, the problem of the huge campaign costs borne by the legislative candidates was alleviated. It is said that this party provided financial assistance for 100 of its cadres, each of whom was able to receive IDR10 billion.<sup>\*\*\*</sup> Steps like this will help to prevent future aspirants to political positions from such onerous debt burdens, enabling them to focus immediately on work and, of course, be expected to be honest in carrying out their duties.

### **Concluding Remarks**

From all that has been discussed above, it can be concluded that democratisation in Indonesia has not resulted in the strengthening of political parties as an essential element of democracy. The institutionalisation of the party system only gave birth to the formality of competition through regular elections every five years. If the only requirement for a strong institutionalisation of the party system is the presence of competition, then the strengthening of democracy can be said to be taking place. But the spirit of competition between parties has not been accompanied by the strengthening of the parties' own organisations. All political parties that have received votes in parliament have experienced internal conflicts, and this weakens them. Scholars have warned that this is a sign that the institutionalisation of the party system is not strengthening. Importantly, an aspect of Indonesian politics that may

---

<sup>\*\*\*</sup> Personal communication with a member of parliament who was offered this fund assistance (June 2020).



hinder this process even further is the pattern of party leadership focusing on their own ambitions at the expense of allowing cadres opportunities to achieve their political ambitions. Many of the leaders will prevent cadres from occupying top leadership positions merely out of a desire to retain their own positions.

Scholars are in tune with the importance of political parties in promoting and strengthening democracy. Political parties are what bridge the aspirations of the people and the authorities. Political parties are also able to resolve conflicts that occur in society by basing themselves on the principles of equality and individual freedom. Nonetheless, it should be noted that political parties in Indonesia have perennial problems that render them weak. By using an open proportional system in elections, for example, political parties do not seem to be competing, considering that those competing in the pemilu are party cadres. Even though the political parties register their cadres in the pemilu, they are in a weak position, so they cannot have full control after the cadres sit in the DPR. In addition to the open proportional system, the cadres themselves do not receive party support other than simply being registered. Consequently, they must finance their own campaigns for office as members of the DPR. These cadres, on the other hand, must also compete with colleagues from their own party who are vying for elected office in the DPR. What is even worse is that those who want to compete in both the pemilu and the pilkada are asked for a political dowry by their party. It doesn't stop there; the parties also encourage their cadres, once elected, to procure projects, for which they are paid a fee. This is the way in which political parties earn money, with the added impact of their members committing acts of corruption.

Unfortunately, political corruption is rampant and is carried out by individuals as well as groups. Corrupt acts committed by politicians and regional leaders are in part the result of the high costs of political campaigns in which candidates for the DPR must raise huge sums. On top of that, several candidates running in the pilkada elections have been exploited by party leaders who support their candidacies for regent, governor or mayor but then demanding a 'dowry' payment in return. This 'dowry' has become something of an open secret – difficult to prove, but widely thought to be true. In the case of the Regent of Central Lampung, the involvement of the chairman of the PKB was indisputable. He clearly received gratification when a businessman paid him a dowry to support a candidate of the entrepreneur's preference.

These cases of money politics, especially those given by candidates for DPR or for regional office to their voters, have created patronage. The freedom of the people to vote in a democratic system is undermined by this pattern of political patronage in which the vote is bought by the candidates. The successful implementation of general elections can be seen as a sign of democracy indeed being carried out and successful, but the persistence of patronage leads the people's vote that will determine their fate and that of the state is sold at a cheap price and is obtained instantly during pemilu. Consequently, the people's choice is not based on the creative ideas proposed by the candidates but on how much their votes are paid for by the candidates.

Many party cadres are unable to afford the high costs of campaigning for office, thus there is always the temptation for politicians to be involved in acts of corruption. And what contributes to creating such a corrupt situation and mentality is the weakness of the political parties themselves. Political parties are not only unhelpful to pilkada candidates at any level as far as winning the election, but on top of that they will ask for dowry from these candidates. Moreover, the party still hopes to receive payments from its cadres once elected to office. The consequence is that after more than twenty years since the political reform was carried out, the cadres of political parties are now involved in political corruption. A corrupt mentality has indeed plagued politicians, and efforts to change it by just inviting them to become honest politicians who are considered good by the public are not enough.

If political corruption in Indonesia is related to political parties because a large number of their politicians have committed corruption, its eradication depends on the work of political parties and their politicians. Of course, the first thing is to improve oneself, such as strengthening efforts to institutionalise the party, which includes strengthening regeneration and party finances. And what is very important is the intention to build up the nation and its politics by becoming a good politician. Thus, coalitions with other parties, especially with the ruling government party, should not be based only on temporary interests, such as obtaining government projects that generate money for the party, but also on the similarity of ideas in the context of Indonesian nation building. Although difficult, given the fact that many parties have problems getting sufficient funds to finance their programs, a change to not getting money in illegal ways must be done if you want a better Indonesia.

In addition, the government itself must take firm action against anyone involved in corruption, including of course the politicians who are members of the coalition. Apart from that, the general public itself must be active in highlighting and then reporting acts of corruption, including by the politicians they support. Regarding the latter, it is indeed a bit difficult, considering that the community has no authority other than to report secretly, for example by sending letters to the anti-corruption commission. The community is also not used to taking part in eradicating corruption through their participation in politics because their political culture has only reached the parochial level. Therefore, the party that must be active in eradicating corruption is the government itself, at least by strengthening the existing rules. Carrying out law enforcement, especially by the KPK, the institution that is given the authority to eradicate corruption, is necessary. Aware of the weakness of political parties that lead to the birth of corruption by their cadres, the government at the suggestion of several circles is planning to disburse assistance of IDR 6 trillion annually starting in 2023. Will there be a change in the behaviour of the party itself with this assistance? Of course, there is no way to know until the plan is realised after 2023.

### References

- Adams, H. (2008). Against Plutocracies: Fighting Political Corruption. *Constellations*, 15(1), 126-147.
- Alatas, S. H. (1975). *The Sociology of Corruption: The Nature, Function, Causes and Prevention of Corruption*. Singapore: Delta Orient (Pte) Ltd.
- Ainun, Y. (2020, 12 December). Menjerat Dalang Amplop Sumiatim [Trapping the Mastermind of Sumiatim's Envelopes]. *Times Indonesia*. Retrieved from <https://www.timesindonesia.co.id/read/news/315518/menjerat-dalang-amplop-sumiatim>
- Aji, M.R. (2019, 25 November). Surat Musa Zainuddin yang Beberkan Aliran Uang ke Elit PKB [Musa Zainuddin's Letter Explaining the Flow of Money to the PKB Elite]. *Tempo.Co*. Retrieved from: <https://nasional.tempo.co/read/1276300/surat-musa-zainuddin-yang-beberkan-aliran-uang-ke-elit-pkb/full&view=ok>
- Aji, M.R. (2021, 8 March). Sidang Korupsi Bansos Covid-19, 2 Politikus PDIP Disebut Punya Jatah Kuota [Covid-19 Bansos Corruption Session, 2 PDIP Politicians Called to Have Quota Allotments]. *Tempo.co*. Retrieved from <https://nasional.tempo.co/read/1440088/sidang-korupsi-bansos-covid-19-2-politikus-pdip-disebut-punya-jatah-kuota>
- Aspinal, E. & Berenschot, W. (2019). *Democracy for Sale: Elections, Clientelism, and the State in Indonesia*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.
- Basedau, M. & Stroh, A. (2008). *Measuring Party Institutionalisation in Developing Countries: A New Research Instrument Applied to 28 African Political Parties*. GIGA Working Paper, 69.

- Bourchier, D.M. (2019). Two Decades of Ideological Contestation in Indonesia: From Democratic Cosmopolitanism to Religious Nationalism. *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, 49(5), 713–733. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00472336.2019.1590620>
- CNN Indonesia (2019). *Pemerintah Guyur Parpol Rp6 T per Tahun Mulai 2023* [The Government Gives Political Parties IDR6 Trillion per Year Starting in 2023]. Retrieved from <https://www.cnnindonesia.com/ekonomi/20191104211517-532-445593/pemerintah-guyur-parpol-rp6-t-per-tahun-mulai-2023>
- Fionna, U. (2013). *The Institutionalisation of Political Parties in Post Authoritarian Indonesia from the Grassroots Up*. Publications Series Monographs 11, (Amsterdam: IIAS / Amsterdam University Press).
- Hardoon, D. & Heinrich, F. (2013). *Global Corruption Barometer 2013*. Transparency International.
- Irawan, A. & Abdullah Dahlan Apung Widadi (2012). *Korupsi Pemilukada* [Corruption of Regional Election]. Jakarta: Indonesia Corruption Watch.
- Muhammad Idris, M. (2020) Mengintip Gaji Take Home Pay Anggota DPR RI [Snooping Salary of DPR Members]. Kompas.com. Retrieved from: <https://money.kompas.com/read/2020/09/27/130237626/mengintip-gaji-take-home-pay-anggota-dpr-ri?page=all>
- KPK (2017). *Kisah korupsi Kita: Anatomi Kasus-Kasus Besar dalam Kajian Interdisipliner* [A Story of our Corruption: some cases in multi-discipline study]. Jakarta: KPK.
- Mardhatillah, A. (2019, 15 August) Syarat Ambang Batas Pencalonan Kepala Daerah Dipersoalkan [The Regulation on Election of Regional Heads is Questioned]. *Hukum Online.com*. Retrieved from: <https://www.hukumonline.com/berita/baca/lt5d553f861e97a/syarat-ambang-batas-pencalonan-kepala-daerah-dipersoalkan/>.
- Mietzner, M (2015). Dysfunction by Design: Political Finance and Corruption in Indonesia. *Critical Asian Studies*, 47(4), 587–610. DOI: 10.1080/14672715.2015.1079991.
- Newell, J.L. & Bull, M.J (2003). Introduction. In Bull Martin J. & James L Newell (Eds.), *Corruption in Contemporary Politics*. New York: Palgrave Mcmillan.
- Priyatin, S. (2018, 13 February). Biaya Untuk Jadi Kepala Daerah Lebih dari Rp 350 Miliar [The cost to become a regional head is more than IDR 350 billion]. *Kompas.com*. Retrieved from: <https://regional.kompas.com/read/2018/02/13/17170031/biaya-untuk-jadi-kepala-daerah-lebih-dari-rp-350-miliar>.
- Ramadhan, A. (2020, 7 August). KPK Catat 300 Kepala Daerah Jadi Tersangka Korupsi Sejak Pilkada Langsung [KPK Claims 300 Regional Heads as Suspect of Corruption]. *Kompas.com*. Retrieved from: <https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2020/08/07/15133851/kpk-catat-300-kepala-daerah-jadi-tersangka-korupsi-sejak-pilkada-langsung>.
- Riewanto, A. (2015, 3 July). Dana Aspirasi Rawan Dikorup DPR [Aspiration Fund is Prone to be Corrupted by DPR]. *Mahkamah Konstitusi Republik Indonesia*. Retrieved from <https://www.mkri.id/index.php?page=web.Berita&id=11336>
- Satrio, A.D. (2020, 18 November). KPK: 27 Gubernur Terjerat Kasus Korupsi [KPK: 27 Governors committed Corruption]. *OkeNews*. Retrieved from: <https://nasional.okezone.com/read/2020/11/18/337/2311709/kpk-27-gubernur-terjerat-kasus-korupsi>
- Schleiter, P., & Voznaya, A. (2016). Party System Institutionalisation, Accountability and Governmental Corruption. *British Journal of Political Science* (May), 1–28. Retrieved from <http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0007123415000770>.
- Simkada (2020, 8 August). *Mengenal Lebih Jauh Pemilihan Kepala Daerah di Indonesia*. (To Know Better Regional Head Election in Indonesia). Retrieved from

- <https://www.simkada.net/blog/mengenal-lebih-jauh-pemilihan-kepala-daerah-di-indonesia/>.
- Snape, F.R. (1999). Corruption, Collusion and Nepotism in Indonesia. *Third World Quarterly*, 20(3), 589–602.
- Surbakti, R. (2015). Pengantar Fungsi Sistem Pemilihan Umum Anggota DPR dan DPRD [Introduction to Election System of Member of Parliament]. In Indra Pahlevi (Ed.), *Sistem Pemilu di Indonesia: Antara Proporsional dan Mayoritarian*. Jakarta: Pusat Pengkajian, Pengolahan Data dan Informasi (P3DI) Sekretariat Jenderal DPR Republik Indonesia.
- Suyatmiko, W. (2020). *Indeks Persepsi Korupsi 2020* [Perception Index of Corruption] (Transparency International Indonesia).
- Tempo.Co (2010, 5 August) *Seluruh Mantan Anggota DPRD Kota Malang Jadi Tersangka Kasus Korupsi* [All Former Local Legislature of Malang become Suspect of Corruption]. Retrieved from <https://nasional.tempo.co/read/269086/seluruh-mantan-anggota-dprd-kota-malang-jadi-tersangka-kasus-korupsi/full&view=ok>.
- Tomsa, D. (2015). Local Politics and Corruption in Indonesia's Outer Islands. *Bijdragen tot de Taal- Land- en Volkenkunde*, 1(171), 196-219. DOI: 10.1163/22134379-17101005.
- Turmudi, E. (1998). The Tarekat Qadiriyyah Wa Naqsyabandiyah in East Java and Islamic Politics in Indonesia. *Southeast Asian Journal of Social Science*, 26(2), 38-60.
- Turmudi, E. (2004). Patronage, aliran and Islamic ideologies during elections Jombang, East Java. In Hans Antlov & Sven Cederroth (Eds.), *Elections in Indonesia: The New Order and beyond*. London: RoutledgeCurzon.
- Turmudi, E. (2016). Islamic Politics in Contemporary Indonesia. *International Journal of Political Studies*, 2(3), 1-9.
- Ufen, A. (2008). Political Party and Party System Institutionalisation in Southeast Asia: Lessons for Democratic Consolidation in Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand. *The Pacific Review*, 21(3), 327–350. DOI: 10.1080/09512740802134174
- Ufen, A. (2010). Electoral Campaigning in Indonesia: The Professionalization and Commercialization after 1998. *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs*, 29(4), 11-37.
- Wardana, R. (2020). *Biaya Caleg Bisa Mencapai Miliaran, Ini Penyebabnya* [The cost of legislative candidates can reach billions, this is the reason]. Retrieved from <https://lifepal.co.id/media/pemilu-2019-5-biaya-ini-perlu-disiapkan-para-caleg/>
- Wellhofer, E.S. & Hennesey, T.M. (1974). Political Party Development: Institutionalisation, Leadership Recruitment, and Behavior. *American Journal of Political Science*, 18(1), 135.
- Yuniarto, T (2020, 7 December). *Pilkada Langsung Serentak: Sejarah dan Perkembangannya di Indonesia* [Simultaneous Direct Regional Head Election: History and Its Development in Indonesia]. *Kompaspedia*. Available at <https://kompaspedia.kompas.id/baca/paparan-topik/pilkada-langsung-serentak-sejarah-dan-perkembangannya-di-indonesia>.