

**Leadership Ineptitude, Security Deficit and Sustainable Development Crisis in Sub-Saharan Africa**Chinyeaka Justine Igbokwe-Ibeto <sup>[1]</sup> & Kehinde O Osakede <sup>[2]</sup><sup>[1]</sup>Department of Public Administration, Faculty of Management Sciences  
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**Abstract.** Development is driven by a range of contextual (governance) and convergent (precipitating) factors in social formation. Contextual variables are predisposing factors involving creation of an enabling environment which engenders processes (dynamics/triggers) towards sustainable development. A critical vector in this equation is security; the promotion of development has become synonymous with the pursuit of security. At the same time, security has become a prerequisite for sustainable development. Ironically, leadership in Africa have become a huge drain on the scarce resources of the state through a number of avenues, some official and others illicit leading to security and development crisis. Within the framework of transformational leadership theory, this article examined leadership ineptitude, security deficit and sustainable development crisis in sub-Saharan Africa. This article is carried out using a qualitative desktop method in deriving data for addressing the issues raised. It argues that leadership still holds the keys to security deficit and sustainable development in Africa. The import of this article is to ensure that African leaders manage the resources of the state in such a manner that money is conserved for developmental purposes. Africa can achieve this if it embraces ethical rebirth, the rule of law and constitutionalism, international best practice in management of resources and good governance, among other remedial steps.

**Keywords:** accountability, management, stability, transformation, transparency

**Introduction**

Development is driven by a range of contextual (governance) and convergent (precipitating) factors in social formation. Contextual variables are predisposing factors involving creation of an enabling environment which engenders processes (dynamics/triggers) towards sustainable development. One critical element in this equation is security: while the issue of sustainable development is now coterminous with the pursuit of security, security has also become a prerequisite for promoting sustainable development (Duffield, 2001). This is corroborated by Onimode (1995), who argued that, a conducive and enabling environment of peace, stability and social justice is a fundamental precondition for not only economic progress, but even for economic survival.

As the experiences of Europe and “Asian Tiger” countries suggest, the manifestation of both variables critically depend on a third factor: Leadership. As a trigger of development trajectories and security, an effective and transformative leadership is a *sin qua non*. In the words of Heilbroner (1985), Saikia (2016), it requires a leadership audacious enough to unleash social change: that is, a total reorientation of societal values so as to reproduce the scale of development transformation of Asian Tigers in Sub-Saharan Africa. It is on this backdrop that this article seeks to examine the issue of leadership ineptitude, security deficit and sustainable development crisis in Sub-Saharan Africa.

### **Methodology**

This article is theoretical in nature and drew its arguments mostly from secondary data using qualitative desktop method in deriving data for interrogating the subject of the article. 60 literature sources were consulted and analysed in order to explore the issue of leadership ineptitude, security deficit and sustainable development crisis in Sub-Sahara Africa. This includes journal publications, textbooks and internet sources relevant to this article. Authoritative scholarly sources were reviewed, during a desktop study. The purpose was to identify the relevant publications and apply them in this article.

### **Conceptual and Theoretical Clarifications**

Leadership as a concept in the social and management sciences has enjoyed scholarly attention. According to Igbokwe-Ibeto and Osakede (2022:2), leaders are influencers with focus on their ability to put together other factors of production to achieve organisational goals. According to Anazodo, Igbokwe-Ibeto and Nkah (2015), leadership is both the adhesive and catalyst which bind citizens of a given country together and triggers their motivation towards the achievement of individual and group objectives. After a careful analysis of the leadership impasses in Africa, Achebe in (Anazodo et al., 2015: 45) concludes that the trouble with Africa is simply and squarely a failure of leadership. There is nothing wrong with the African land or climate or water or air or anything else. The African problem is the unwillingness or inability of its leaders to rise to its responsibility, to the challenge of personal example which is the hallmarks of true leadership. A leader influences followers by humbly communicating a prophetic mission and vision of the future in clear terms that resonates with the follower(s) beliefs and values in such a way that the follower(s) can comprehend and interpret the future into present-time.

The nexus between leadership and security cannot be overemphasized. Security can be seen as protection from, or resilience against potential harm caused by others, by restraining the freedom of others to act. Beneficiaries of security may be objects and institutions, persons and social groups, ecosystems or phenomenon vulnerable to unwanted change (Wikipedia, 2022). Security can also be defined as the pursuit of freedom from threat and the ability of states and societies to maintain their independent identity and their functional integrity against forces of change, which they see as hostile (Studymoose.com). Security and development need to be sustained.

Sustainable development is the current paradigm of the United Nations. The term sustainable development can be viewed as development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of the future generations to meet their own needs. There are four dimensions to sustainable development – society, environment, culture and economy which are intertwined. Sustainability is a paradigm for thinking about the future in which environmental, societal and economic considerations are balanced in the pursuit of an improved quality of life. For example, a prosperous society relies on a healthy environment to provide food and resources, safe drinking water and clean air for its citizens.

There are several theoretical windows through which the issue of leadership, security and sustainable development can be analysed. However, for the purpose of the article, transformational leadership theory is found heuristic. Transformation leadership theory is found on the premise that service delivery can be improved when leaders inspire their subordinates to be more patriotic to the goals of nation building rather than pursuing narrow and personal interests (Igbokwe-Ibeto & Fatile, 2013; Bass, 1985; Burns, 1978). The transformational leadership theory incorporates a number of known leadership behaviors. For example, a transformational leader may exhibit the features of democratic, participative, or even autocratic leadership styles (Bass, 1995). According to Dinh, Lord, Gardner, Meuse, Liden and Hu (2014), these aforementioned leadership styles are often categorised as

behavioral theories because they deal with the ways and manners that individuals act in managerial activities (Igbokwe-Ibeto & Fatile, 2013). Transformational leaders engage with followers and influence them to focus on higher-level human needs for personal achievements and self-actualization (Burns, 1978). Transformational leaders inspire their followers to perform beyond expectations as regards their contributions to nation building (Bass, 1995). It is a win-win situation for the followers and the society in question. The society benefits from stronger citizens commitment while the achievements of the citizens will translate to improved development for the nation. Conclusively, Geier (2016) claimed that transformational leadership within the context of leadership model is adaptive and not static behavioral phenomena.

### **Sub-Sahara Africa: Terrain of Conflict and Underdevelopment Crisis**

Sub-Sahara Africa is plagued with the trauma of disturbing spectrum of violence, demographic explosion, social fragmentation and decay, sectarian upheaval, commercialization of political practice, catastrophic balance between ethnic groups, economic and political issues, depressions, and articulation of primordial class interest (Azar & Moon, 1984). This troubling state of affairs in the sub-region is also graphically captured in the annual surveys of Global Peace Index (GPI), and the Fragile State Index (FSI), based on social, economic and political indicators to determine the level of stability or fragility in each of the African states. In the words of Kaplan (1994), Africa is now the symbol of worldwide environmental, societal and demographic stress, in which criminality and anarchy emerges as the real strategic danger. Unprovoked crime, overpopulation, scarcity of resources, disease, refugee migrations, security firms, the empowerment of private armies, and international drug cartels ([www.scienceblog.com](http://www.scienceblog.com)) and latterly child trafficking, terrorism, banditry and kidnapping are common phenomena in African prism. Africa currently provides a framework of issues confronting Africa's civilisation, often extremely unpleasant to discuss.

Although Kaplan's observation was made in the 1990s, this characterization of the scale and alarming security and developmental challenges has assumed murderous dimensions to the sovereignty, lives and property of citizens in the continent. Security environment in Sub-Sahara Africa is now a "Hobbesian nightmare", a state of widespread anarchy characterized by wanton destruction of life and property in West, Central, East and Southern Africa. For example, in its survey of the Nigerian condition, the US Council on Foreign Relations entry put the number of deaths across 17 states in Nigeria since June 2015 to 2019 at 19,890 while between 2011 and 2018 at about 54,595 lives lost due to activities of the insurgents.

The Global Index on Terrorism Reports on Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia, Ethiopia, Central African Republic, and Mozambique are equally grim. As one observer notes, if the trend of killings in this countries persist, they would soon find themselves competing in ranking with war-torn countries of Syria, Somalia, Yemen and Afghanistan (The Guardian, 2018; [www.burmalibrary.org](http://www.burmalibrary.org)). However, in terms of threat assessment, considered from the standpoint of actors, issues, strategies and outcome of the current conflict spectrum in the sub-region, there are fundamental conformity and discontinuity from past traditional forms of irredentism, vigilantism, wars of session and hegemonic control by contending social forces: organized militias, warlords, criminal gangs, drug cartels, mercenaries and bounty hunters.

This unsettling and damaging condition is reflected in some past and current report on conflict and development in Sub-Sahara Africa. For instance, Omar Touray estimated that some 26 armed conflicts erupted in Africa between 1963 and 1998 affecting 474 million people or 61 per cent of the continents population. At Sub-regional levels, 79 per cent of the

populations were in East Africa, 73 per cent in Central Africa, 46 per cent in West Africa, 51 per cent in North Africa and 29 per cent in Southern Africa ([www.africanbookscollective.com](http://www.africanbookscollective.com)). These glaring statistics are suggestive of a continent in paralyzing security crisis fuelled by accelerating economic stagnation. The effect of these internal convulsions on sustainable development programmes in Sub-Sahara Africa cannot be overemphasised.

Such effect as Ali and Ali (2010) includes the destruction of both human and physical capital, the disruption of economic transactions, including the increased cost of conducting such transactions, and the distortion of resource allocation by the states ([www.africanbookscollective.com](http://www.africanbookscollective.com)). It is in this context that the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) argues that the collateral mitigation of conflict and violent conflict impedes sustainable development (as could be seen in several African countries) by destroying infrastructure, inhibiting sustainable management of resources, forestalling foreign investment, undermining the fight against poverty and inhibiting planning for future generations (Renner, 2007). This ontological linkage between conflict and development crisis makes conflict prevention and control a fundamental requirement for the achievement of sustainable development (Ibaba, 2009). The devastating social consequences of civil disorder in Sub-Sahara Africa have become a central inhibiting factor for the quest for meaningful development. Statistical comparison of Africa and other regions suggest that Africa surpasses in terms of civil war and collateral destruction of infrastructures for economic development ([www.apexjournal.org](http://www.apexjournal.org); Carment et al., 2018).

The convulsive dimensions of crisis resulting from the convergence of incendiary factors are the carnage of Rwanda and DR Congo, the mayhem in Darfur and Somalia and the horrific violence, large scale torture of civilians, pillage of rural institutions and industrial assets and mass looting of village property in Sierra-Leone and Central African Republic ([www.africanbookscollective.com](http://www.africanbookscollective.com); Restruzyaik, 2016). Indeed, as currently the case in Nigeria, Chad, Sudan, Ethiopia and Mozambique, internal convulsion has become a semi-permanent feature of the post-cold war African landscape. These conflicts result from an extraordinary complex mix of factors, including multi-ethnic, communal cleavages and disintegrations, underdevelopment, poverty and distributive justice (Hampson, 2016). The underlying sources of these conflicts gravitate around what Azar (1996) calls the core identity in plural societies dominated by primordial cleavages (racial, religious bigotry, ethnic or cultural) sustained by competition for control of state instrumentalities for patronage. The consequent breakdown of civil order in extreme circumstances (Somalia, Congo Democratic Republic, Chad, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Sudan, South Sudan etc.) resulted from the over-politicization of the state as an organ to be monopolized for absolute power and accelerated economic advancement (Falton, 1988). The destabilizing consequences of this Hobbesian nightmare is a state of widespread anarchy characterized by wanton destruction of life and property in many parts of the continent as a result of gladiatorial or exclusionary politics, resulting in states declining capacity to rule or to maintain the conditions for the operation of its productive infrastructures ([www.africanbookscollective.com](http://www.africanbookscollective.com)). Flowing from the foregoing, Duffield (2011) argues that:

*Helping strengthen the capacity of a society to manage conflict without violence must be seen as a foundation for sustainable development. The promotion of development has become synonymous with the pursuit of security. At the same time, security has become a prerequisite for sustainable development.*

The accelerated violence and insecurity in the sub-continent has been associated with structural issues generating mass poverty, religious fanaticism, and social exclusion in terms of the settler-indigene syndrome. The linkage between these indices of insecurity and

underdevelopment crisis has been the focus of policy analysis and prognosis for action both at the continental (African Union) and Sub-region (ECOWAS, ECCAS, SADC, EASF, NARC) levels. Structurally induced underdevelopment crisis breeds conflict and conflict in turn sustains the quagmire of economic crisis and widespread poverty in Africa, as currently witness in Ethiopia, Cameroon, Nigeria, Mali, Niger, Guinea, Burkina Faso, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Central African Republic.

### **Policy Response**

The convergence of insecurity and underdevelopment crisis has accelerated the spectre of structurally-induced poverty: institutionalized constraints within the socio-economic and political environment which may hinder an individual from realizing his life ambition. This condition is aggravated by existing governance system in African countries, characterized by weak formal institutions, personalized authority, pervasive corruption, and large scope of discretion among public officials (dokumen.pub). According to Lewis (2010), the spectrum of actual policy choices, reform process, and political configurations in the developing world indicate that economic outcomes are contingent (dokumen.pub). States with accelerated transformation programmes behave in a developmental rather than predatory fashion, giving priority to growth and capital accumulation over consumption or redistribution (dokumen.pub). While rent seeking and collusion frequently create dynamics that impair growth or change, the state predation is neither predetermined nor immutable (Lewis, 2010).

The persistent question confronting Sub-Sahara African states in general is the necessary and sufficient preconditions for transformation into a development state. As could be inferred from the experiences of the Asian Tigers, the ultimate response to this atrophied condition at the state system level resides first, in addressing a range of contextual and convergent factors as drivers of socioeconomic and technological transformation of states in the region (contextual parameters) necessarily entails: (i) a strong state, (ii) good governance, (iii) leadership audacious enough to unleash social change, and (iv) policy measures for dealing with the current crisis and laying the foundation for transformation in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

The case for a strong state and good governance hinges on the historically invariant evidence from development studies. To Leftwich (1994), development is fundamentally a political matter and that it is difficult to conceptualise good governance in isolation of the forms of politics and type of state which alone can generate, sustain and protect it. On this view, it has been generally argued in the literature (Deyo, 1987; Bowice, 1991) that contrary to the falsification of recent history, it was a strong and effective state and not markets that built modern South Korea. In other words, where the state is corrupt and weak as in Nigeria, South Africa and much of Africa, it is to be reformed and strengthened, not weakened further and undermined as the calamitous impact of the World Bank's Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) on these countries demonstrates (link.springer.com). According to Amin (2013) it is "not markets that built Western Europe, USA and Japan. Mercantilism that launched Britain into Industrial Revolution was about the strong state which accumulated and centralized the capital for the transformation of Britain through Royal chartered monopoly companies.

As a trigger of developmental trajectories, the essentials of good governance as Anazodo et al. (2015); Boeninger (1992) observed include: (i) capacities for exercising authority; (ii) solving problems; (iii) resolving conflicts; (iv) implementing programmes and policies. Good governance in this context proposes the entrenchment of a culture of efficient leadership and policy direction. It could be argued that the critical factor in the emergence of efficient and result-oriented governance is a transformative and disciplined leadership that political economists considered an inescapable prerequisite for realistic chance of re-joining

the race for development (Anya, 2005). The leadership question has, therefore, been at the epicentre of disputation concerning good governance in Africa. It has been observed that persistent leadership dilemma reveals that a skewed paradigm which subordinates national interest to self-interest stripes leadership of its integrity, undermines its legitimacy, distorts its core meaning and under develops society (greatriversofhope. wordpress.com).

Thus, in the African context, it has been persistently asked why a continent so endowed with human and material resources is still suffocating in an abysmal crisis of technological underdevelopment, endemic poverty in the midst of phenomenal wealth, suffocating squalor, incredible ignorance and superstition, as well as ravaging diseases (Igbokwe-Ibeto, Osawe & Alegbeleye, 2014; Oyeboode, 2012)? The answer for most scholars resides mainly in leadership deficit. Thus, for Achebe (1982), the trouble with Africa is simply and squarely a failure of leadership. The political space of Africa has been dominated by prebendal leadership – leaders that conceive of politics as a clearing house for jobs, contract and official plunder (aapw.org; Anazode et al., 2015; Joseph, 1991). As Ikoku Observed:

*Leadership inadequacy has been at the heart of the African political problem since independence. It has not been the failure of an individual or of a political party. It has been the failure of a political class in particular and African elite in general.*

The conventional literature on the sociology of development pioneered by prominent scholars such as Rostow, Heilbroner, McClelland and Huntington have largely attributed the prevalent crisis of underdevelopment in peripheral formations in Sub-Sahara Africa to leadership failure with collateral consequences of faulty policy direction, organizational incompetence, corruption, bazaar mentality of entrepreneurs, and damaging work ethics of public servants (Igbokwe-Ibeto & Osakede, 2017).

Thus, at the regional level, the reproduction of this catastrophic balance in state-society relations in Africa is manifest in prevalent and protracted crisis in all the countries. The continued eruption of conflicts on the continent strongly suggest that there is a compelling need to tackle the structural causes that led to those fratricidal conflicts in the first place ([www.iss.co.za](http://www.iss.co.za)). These structural factors include: bad economic policies, lack of transparent and inclusive governance and their incapacity to play their regulatory functions (Kwesi, 2005). This structural deformity is directly linked to the various aspects of development failures in Africa as a continent (Igbokwe-Ibeto, 2018). In this context, the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) forewarned that frustration caused by persistent unemployment and lack of opportunities is likely to prompt young people to graduate towards a charismatic and opportunist social revolutionary who blame the current structure of society for their problem ([www.uneca.org](http://www.uneca.org); Agbodike, Igbokwe-Ibeto & Umeifekwem, 2015).

This security-development nexus and programming are expressed in enabling documents of African Union (AU), and in particular the protocol establishing the Peace and Security Council (PSC) and the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Co-operation in Africa (CSSDCA), the framework document of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) (Burton, Powell, Tiekou, & Akuffo, 2004), which all acknowledge that development and integration goal/objectives need to be reconciled with the task of conflict prevention, conflict management, peacekeeping, and even, at times, peace enforcement (Schalkkwyk, 2015). This is so because of the empirical evidence on the destructive interface between state fragility, violent social conflict and underdevelopment crisis in Africa. According to the Global Risk 2015 Report by World Economic Forum in Africa, the consequences of these internal convulsion are manifest in extensive multiple disorders that characterize the African region (Forbes, 2015). These include: high structural unemployment or underdevelopment, profound social instability, failed/collapsed state

syndrome, unimaginable inflation, failure/shortfall of critical infrastructure, massive incident of fraud/theft, and stag inflationary economy (Forbes, 2015).

The destabilising consequences of these numerous contradictions as captured by a number of analysts have been the prevalence of gladiatorial or exclusionary politics, resulting in the declining capacity to rule or to maintain the conditions for the operation of its productive infrastructure (Ali & Matthews, 2004). Available statistics indicates that on a comparative analysis, Africa surpasses other regions in terms of civil war and monumental destruction of infrastructure for economic development. The impact of these internal convulsions on developmental projects and poverty-reduction programmes in Africa has been profound. In the light of prevailing conditions in the continent, security and development have proven antithetical in circumstances of unabated conflict.

Transcending and transforming the prostrate condition in Africa critically depends on its component states evolving, first is innovative policies for structural changes and, second, address factors that inhibit implementation of the range of sectoral plans for industrial development of the continent. In response to these challenges, Africa Unions security architecture places more emphasis on first, establishing a continental security regime with the mandate of preventing, managing and resolving conflicts in Africa. Secondly, specific instruments aimed at curbing Africa's underdevelopment and improving socio-economic growth and development on the continent - NEPAD and the APRM. In structural terms, the security regime is predicated on collective security to be operationalized by an African Standby Force (ASF), an Early Warning System (EWS), a Panel of the Wise (PW), and a Peace Fund (PF). The core peace and security decision making institutions include the Assembly of Heads of States and Government (AHSO), the Peace and Security Council (PSC) and the Commission of the AU. Although, the AHSO makes the final decision on important peace and security issues such as the intervention in member states of the AU, the PSC, which meets regularly at the permanent representative level, is empowered to take most decisions on security issues on behalf of the AHSO. The AHSO however, meet at least once a year to review the work and activities of the PSC as part of its oversight of the AU (Powell & Tiekou, 2005: 942).

The tasks given to this mechanism is to anticipate and prevent potential conflict situations so as not to develop into full-blown wars. It is mandated to undertake peace-building and peace-making efforts where full-blown conflict arises as well as to carry out peace-building and peace-making in the post conflict situations (Deconing, 2004). The overall aim is to promote peaceful coexistence, stability and security in Africa; to enhance and implement post conflict peace-building and reconstruction; to develop and operationalize common defence policy; to harmonise and coordinate continental efforts in the prevention and tackling of international terrorism, as well as to promote and enhance respect for human rights and the sanctity of life (Touray, 2000). This express commitment is provided in the enabling protocol (Article 4) of the constitutive Act of the African Union, which requires that member states of the Union takes steps to establish standing contingents for participation in peace support missions decided on by the PSC or intervention authorized by the Assembly (Neethlong, 2005).

Flowing from the above, it is imperative that a grand strategy for sustainable peace and development of African states must integrate both the contextual and convergent factors as drivers of socio-economic and technological transformation. In the view of Onimode (2018), such a strategic framework must embody the vision, structural interface and cybernetics of the new system. In other words, effective response to the challenges of sustainable peace and development of states in Africa must be holistic and requires that state actors should seek to understand causes of the problem and dynamics of the domestic and transnational forces that sustain the quagmire.

Despite its wobbling and atrophied state, AU constitutes a powerful base for accelerating the creation of African Economic Community. In other words, the illusions of independent national development by Africa's poor mini-states must be jettisoned urgently and totally (Onimode, 2018). To achieve this goal, a conducive and enabling environment of peace and stability is a fundamental precondition for sustainable development.

Within the context of developmental and security challenges in Africa, there is an urgent need to reverse the paralysing condition of social disintegration, rising crimes, insecurity, high and increasing unemployment and underemployment, drugs and collapsing social services through relevant policy instruments in various regional integration scheme such as the AU, NEPAD and APRM. This process can be accelerated by pragmatic commitment to regional and sub-regional integration programmes articulated in the AU and other sub-regional bodies to transcend the fallacy of independent national development by Africa's derelict post-colonial formations. As Powell and Tiekou (2015) argues, it is important to note that the challenges confronting the AU's new security regime are so huge and complex. Presently, the AU does not have the financial resources to implement many of its proposed changes. Furthermore, a considerable number of African states lack the operational capacity and capability in terms of equipment and logistics as well as human capital to develop their own military capacity. This has so far hindered sub-regional efforts (especially in West and East Africa) to contain Boko Haram, banditry and terrorism insurgency through Multi-National Joint Task Force in the Lake Chad Basin in West Africa and Al-Shabab in Somalia. This prostrate condition has drawn attention once again the importance of creating through transformative policy regime an irreversible dynamics towards a continental security-community within the framework of AU, by putting in place regional planning mechanisms technically essential to the politically desirable task of combating Africa's flashpoints. This conclusion appears to be the most crucial inference to be drawn from a survey of contemporary European experience and it also constitutes the basic yardstick upon which an interpretation of functional relations in a number of regional subsystems (the Scandinavian and North American Sub-zones, for example) can be constructed.

As defined by one of its principal exponents Seunghoon (2012), the concept of security-community focuses on preventing violent conflict among members of a community of nations, through a conscious political process involving the resolution of social problems, normally by institutionalised procedure, without resort to large-scale physical force. Historically, the manifestation of such a community has taken two different (but not mutual exclusive) forms: amalgamated and pluralistic security-communities. The former involves the formal merger of previously independent units into a macro-political entity with a single supreme decision-making centre (Deutsch, 2015). The United States, Canada and Nigeria today, among others are cardinal examples of this amalgamated type. According to Deutsch (2015), the concept "pluralistic" security-community on the contrary, retains the legal independence of separate political units. Again, the combined territory of the United States and Canada or that of the EEC countries is a prime example of the pluralistic type. These separate political units form a security-community without a formal merger.

It has been fairly obvious from the bitter controversy between the generally radical Casablanca groups of African countries and the conservative Monrovia/Brazzaville group in the period immediately preceding the establishment of the OAU, that the former's conception and definition of African Unity enshrines the notion of amalgamated security-community. According to Ijomah (1977), one of the leading activists in this group of African statesmen – Kwame Nkrumah outlined three major reasons why Africa must unite in his celebrated appeal to the founding fathers of the OAU in Addis Ababa in 1963. The first was the urgent need for a unified economic planning; the second was the need for a unified military and defence strategy; and the third which is consequent upon the first two, was the need for a



unified foreign policy and diplomacy (Mazrui, 1980; Ijomah, 1977). Undoubtedly, Nkrumah's vision and rationale for this grand design of African unity had their roots in a sobering uncanny assessment of the geopolitical realities facing the post-independence states of Africa in the contemporary global system. He was also an aspiration less subject to historical structures when compared for instance, with the design of West European federalists in the post-second world war era.

It would however, be misleading to adjudge from this analysis that the differences between the twenty nine (29) head of governments prior to the establishment of the OAU were those of tactics rather than of overall objective in creation of an amalgamated security-community in Africa. In fact, the controversy between the Casablanca group on the one hand and the Monrovia/Lagos/Brazzaville groups on the other hand, stemmed from distinct and almost irreconcilable world views. The issue according to Holsti (2013) was two conflicting conceptions of international and regional order, two different views of the historical process and two variant visions of the future. Furthermore, what gives the controversy its tragic quality is that each approach to regional order might have succeeded in the dynamic condition of the early 1960s. Each group had the power to prevent the other from realizing its objective; yet, neither can achieve its own without the cooperation of the opponent. It was not surprising therefore, that what finally emerged as the OAU was nothing more than a compromise of convenience with each signatory free to go its own way in times of their need.

While the possibility of establishing an amalgamated security-community in Africa today is doubtful given the existing and likely conditions, the same conclusion cannot be considered self-evidence in the case of a pluralistic security-community (Deutsch, 2015), the development of which is self-reliance strategy as stipulated in the Lagos Plan of Action. According to Onditi, Ben-Nun, and Edmond (2021), a pluralistic security-community is based on the legal independence of its constituent governments while at the same time creating the conditions for regional stabilization and self-reliance. That is, the resolution of social problems will be conducted through institutionalized procedures, without resort to physical force. Conversely, members of this community can utilize existing regional infrastructures in collaborative responses to threats from immediate and external environments.

This observation notwithstanding, remains our (authors) undiminished conviction that functional strategies for ending the economic vassalage of Africa such as that advocated by the Lagos Plan of Action cannot flourish in a condition of multiple disorder; that is, of suspicion, mistrust and secrecy. It is thus, vitally important that parallel and relentless endeavours be made to create a pluralistic security-community in Africa, by means, *inter alia*, of a regional security system. As Mazrui forewarned, protecting Africa from external enemies and internal deviants needs more than vigilante exercises from time to time. It needs the political will to transcend Africa's own fragmentation and establish a capacity for self-defence, for self-pacification and ultimately for genuine self-development (downloads.bbc.co.uk).

### Conclusion

The concept of leadership ineptitude, security deficit and sustainable development as captured by scholars and social commentators has been espoused with an attempt at clarifying the intellectual-cobweb surrounding the issue of leadership ineptitude, security deficit and sustainable development crisis in sub-Saharan Africa. To scientifically undertake the purpose of the article, this article traversed theoretical framework, conceptualizations, and discussed dominant issues in leadership ineptitude and security deficit relations with sustainable development. To this end, the theory on transformational leadership has been examined as postulated by scholars. An attempt has also been made to establish the nexus

between leadership ineptitude, security deficit and sustainable development in sub-Saharan Africa.

This article established that the promotion of development has become synonymous with the pursuit of security and at the same time, security has become a prerequisite for sustainable peace and development. The paper took an in-depth look into the hydra-headed challenges that might have contributed to the spectrum of crisis in sub-Saharan Africa and dealt with the dominant ones for space constraint. These includes the demographic explosion, social fragmentation and decay, sectarian upheaval, commercialization of political practice, catastrophic balance between ethnic groups, economic and political issues and depressions, and articulation of primordial class interest. In the prevailing condition in Africa, there is a desperate and urgent need to reverse the paralysing conditions of social disintegration, rising crimes, high and increasing unemployment and underemployment, drugs, and collapsing social services through relevant policy recommendations in various regional integration scheme such as the AU and NEPAD. This process can be accelerated by pragmatic commitment of African states to regional and sub-regional integration programmes to transcend the fallacy of independent national development by Africa's poor mini-states. Therefore, what is urgently needed is to create an irreversible dynamics towards the African Economic Community by instituting regional planning mechanisms technically essential to the desirable task of transforming the African states.

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The author declares that they have no financial or personal relationships that may have inappropriately influenced them in writing this article.

#### **Author's Contributions**

Prof. Kehinde O. Osakede assembled the research materials while Dr. Chinyeaka J. Igbokwe-Ibeto did the data filtering and article writing.

#### **Ethical Considerations**

This article followed all ethical standards for research without direct contact with human or animal subjects.

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